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Part I 
1 Introduction 
Over the past decades free trade agreements have been addressed by many countries. After 
the Second World War the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was 
introduced to foster economic recovery and free trade among all nations. The agreement 
was signed by 23 countries. The long term goal of GATT was to abolish all trade barriers 
between nations. Consequently, GATT explicitly encouraged the idea of deeper economic 
relationships between nations through regional free trade agreements.   
The corner stone for this new economic order was laid in Bretton Woods, adopting a new 
system of exchange rates, and founding GATT, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (later World Bank).  
Europe was quick to adopt a free trade policy, at least between the founding members1 of 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). All the founding members were 
economically more or less at the same level. All of them had suffered the consequences of 
two world wars and they all hoped for long lasting peace in Europe by tightly linking their 
trade and by building a foundation for economic development. 
Later more free trade agreements succeeded, one of them is NAFTA, the North American 
Free Trade Agreement. The participating nations are Canada, Mexico and the United 
States. What makes this free trade agreement particularly interesting is the combination of 
partners: “NAFTA is an unprecedented reciprocal free trade accord between high-
productivity industrialized nations and a low-productivity developing country.”2 
After thirteen years of being in place, how far has economic integration gone? Have the 
initial expectations been met? 
Another point of interest is the recent history of the European Union (EU). Since its 
beginnings with the ECSC Europe has amazingly developed far beyond a free trade union 
into a political union, covering by now big parts of Europe. In 2004, the biggest 
enlargement in its history took place, giving access to countries of the former Soviet bloc.  
There are some interesting parallels to NAFTA and Mexico’s role in it, as most of the new 
EU member countries are economically far less developed than the “old” EU members. It 
                                                 
1
 France, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy 
2
 See Eaten, George E. et al. (1996) p.21 
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is particularly interesting to highlight Poland’s development in the past years within the 
EU and to make some comparisons to Mexico, which already disposes of a thirteen year 
record within NAFTA.  
Is economic integration possible between unequal partners? Have Mexico’s expectations 
been met? Can Poland’s expectations be met in the future? This paper tries to identify 
economic key indicators that are significant for a nation’s development within a free trade 
agreement. These indicators will be used to review and analyze Mexico’s evolution within 
NAFTA, and to analyze and forecast Poland’s development within the EU. 
As a side note it has to be mentioned that Free Trade Agreements (FTA) can obviously not 
be regarded as isolated constructs, they are on the contrary parts of a much bigger picture 
and are exposed to many different influences. This paper tries to capture the most 
important economic factors and influences. Unfortunately, a deeper analysis of social 
phenomena or politics would go beyond the scope of this work and cannot be conducted in 
depth. Particularly with regard to the EU many other dimensions of integration exist 
besides economic integration that would be worth being analyzed in this context. 
1.1 Economic Integration 
As Bela Balassa defined in his standard publication for economic integration, “we propose 
to define economic integration as a process and a state of affairs. Regarded as a process, it 
encompasses measures designed to abolish discrimination between economic units 
belonging to different national states; viewed as a state of affairs, it can be represented by 
the absence of various forms of discrimination between national economies.”3 
Several levels of economic integration exist. The examples of NAFTA and the EU alone 
represent two different types of economic integration. Following Predöhl4 integration can 
either be pursued in a functional way, and is therefore called functional integration, or in 
an institutional way, which is thus called institutional integration. Functional integration 
means that the process of integration is left over to market mechanisms which are supposed 
to help improve structures in trade and production. Institutional integration on the other 
hand implies the partial abandonment of national sovereignty in favour of common 
institutions. 
                                                 
3
 Balassa, B. (1961), p.1 
4
 See Predöhl, A. / Jürgensen, H. (1961), p.371 
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Following this definition, the NAFTA member states are integrated functionally, as no 
supranational institution has assumed duties which formerly belonged to the national 
sovereignty of the participating countries. The EU has evolved from functional integration 
to institutional integration over the decades and has now a big body of supranational 
institutions that coordinate actions in economics but also in many other areas.  
1.1.1 Degrees of Economic Integration 
Following Balassa5, distinctions are made between different forms of integration, such as 
free trade area, customs union, common market, economic union and total integration. At 
the same time these different forms of integration represent different degrees of economic 
integration: One might also want to list the preferential trade area as a form of integration, 
more concretely as the weakest form of economic integration, as it exists for example 
between the EU and the ACP states6. In that case, tariffs are reduced for certain product 
categories, but tariffs will not be abolished completely. However, Balassa rather calls this a 
cooperation, and not economic integration. The different forms of economic integration 
can be described as follows:  
 Free Trade Area 
A free trade area (like NAFTA) is a form of integration, although a rather weak one. In this 
construct, tariffs and quotas are abolished between the member countries, but with regards 
to non-members each country pursues its own tariff policy. In order to avoid a by-passing 
of the regulations by a non-member country, the member countries use to have rules of 
origin which include a minimum extent of local material inputs and transformations that 
add value to the goods. Only with this requirement fulfilled, goods are entitled for the free 
trade area treatment. Other examples for free trade areas besides NAFTA are AFTA, 
EFTA, and SAFTA7, to name only a few. 
 Customs Union 
The next degree of integration, the so called customs union, does not only delete all 
discriminations in the field of commodity movement within the FTA, it also establishes 
equal tariffs for all member countries with respect to non-members. Thus, a common 
                                                 
5
 See Balassa, B. (1961), p.ix 
6
 African, Carribean and Pacific countries, see also: 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/country/country_en.cfm, accessed on March 28, 2007 
7
 ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) with Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam;  
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) between Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein; and the 
South Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) between India, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Bhutan 
and the Maldives 
 4 
external trade policy is set up. A well-known example for a customs union is 
MERCOSUR8, which comprises some important Latin American countries. 
 Common Market 
A common market goes even further and does not only abolish trade restrictions but also 
restrictions on factor movements within the participating countries. Factor movements are 
movements of labor and capital.  
 Single Market/Economic Union 
The EU can be seen as a common market, although it is commonly called a single market, 
which goes further in the sense of political will to remove physical borders, establish 
common technical standards and adapt fiscal policies within the union in order to 
harmonize politics in these areas. Balassa calls this form of integration economic union. 
 Total Economic Integration 
The highest degree of economic integration is the so called total economic integration, 
which includes, besides all of the above, “the unification of monetary, fiscal, social and 
countercyclical policies and requires the setting-up of a supra-national authority whose 
decisions are binding for the member states.”9 Until now, this level is only reached by 
individual countries and not yet by any supra-national authority. However, the EU is 
evolving into the direction of total economic integration, right now already thirteen 
member countries10 form part of an economic and monetary union, where the Euro is used 
as a common currency. 
1.1.2 Goals of Economic Integration 
“It can be said that the ultimate objective of economic activity is an increase in welfare.”11 
In the case of unequal partners within a FTA, one can say this means that convergence 
effects need to be reached in order to provide welfare to all partners. Economic integration 
is thus the main instrument to reach convergence and the goal of entering a FTA is to reach 
higher welfare. Still, having reached a certain degree of economic integration does not 
automatically lead to convergence between the member states. 
There are various plausible indicators to analyze the level of convergence that should 
follow economic integration. The most obvious one is the difference between countries in 
the level of economic development. Furthermore the effects of investment flows and 
                                                 
8
 Mercado común del Sur (MERCOSUR) between Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay and Venezuela 
9
 Balassa, B. (1961), p.2 
10
 Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Slovenia, Spain 
11
 Balassa, B. (1961), p.10 
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increased capital mobility give insights about a country’s development within a FTA. 
Another indicator is the nature of institutional structures in a country. 
1.2 Quantification of Economic Integration and Convergence 
As Mexico has been part of the NAFTA for more than a decade by now, it is possible to 
observe economic developments that occurred before its entry to the agreement as well as 
the economic evolution from 1994 onwards until now. For Poland, the time spent within 
the EU has been much shorter; however, it is very interesting to look at national statistics 
reaching back to the nineties, as well as at EU statistics that include Poland as a member 
country.  
In the following, indicators and indices of different economic aspects will be described in 
order to give an overview of the tools that will be used in the following sections of this 
paper. The statistics presented below include demographic data, basic economic data, data 
on national finances, labor market indicators, as well as some statistics on infrastructure, 
human development and corruption.  
This combination of different statistics aims at giving an insight into various areas of 
integration and development. The comparison of data among nations and FTAs will allow 
for analysis of convergence within FTAs. 
1.2.1 Demographic Data 
Total Population 
The population is defined as all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship, except 
for refugees who are not permanently settled in the country of asylum. They are generally 
considered as part of the population of their country of origin.12  
Population Growth Rate  
The population growth rate is the “average annual percent change in the population, 
resulting from a surplus (or deficit) of births over deaths and the balance of migrants 
entering and leaving a country.”13 
Birth Rate/Death Rate  
The birth rate and the death rate give the average annual number of births and death during 
a year per 1000 persons in the population. Both rates combined determine the population 
growth rate of a year. 
                                                 
12
 Worldbank: http://devdata.worldbank.org, accessed on March 29, 2007 
13
 CIA World Factbook: https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/docs/notesanddefs.html#2095, 
accessed on March 29, 2007 
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Infant Mortality Rate 
This rate represents the number of infants dying before reaching one year of age, per 1000 
live births in a given year. 
Life Expectancy Rate  
Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a newborn child would live if 
prevailing patterns of mortality at each age remained constant in the future. 
Literacy Rate  
“Literacy is the ability to read and write with understanding a simple statement related to 
one’s daily life. It involves a continuum of reading and writing skills, and often includes 
also basic arithmetic skills.”14 
The literacy rate is “the number of literate persons in a given age group, expressed as a 
percentage of the total population in that age group. The adult literacy rate measures 
literacy in persons aged 15 years and above and the youth literacy rate in persons aged 
between 15 and 24 years.”15 
Population living below Poverty Line 
The World Bank defines the national poverty rate as percentage of the population living 
below the national poverty line. National estimates are based on population-weighted 
subgroup estimates from household surveys.16 Definitions of poverty vary considerably 
among nations. 
1.2.2 Economic Data 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)  
GDP is a growth indicator for the overall economic performance of a country. It comprises 
the total market value of all final goods and services produced by natives and foreigners in 
a country in a given year. It comprises consumption, government spending, investments, 
and exports minus imports (which results in the trade balance)17. It is calculated without 
making deductions for the depreciation of real capital or the depletion and degradation of 
natural resources18. 
 
                                                 
14
 UNESCO: http://www.uis.unesco.org/glossary/Term.aspx?name=Literacy&lang=en, accessed on March 
29, 2007 
15UNESCO: http://www.uis.unesco.org/glossary/Term.aspx?name=Literacy%20rate&lang=en, accessed on 
March 29, 2007 
16
 Worldbank: http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/, accessed on March 29, 2007 
17
 GDP = Consumption + Investment + Government Spending + (Exports – Imports) 
18
 Fischer Weltalmanach (2007): „Nicht enthalten sind Abzüge für die Wertminderung von Sachkapital oder 
die Erschöpfung und Verminderung von Ressourcen.“ 
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GDP Growth Rate 
The GDP growth rate is the annual percentage growth rate of GDP based on constant local 
currency19.  
GDP Composition by Sector 
The GDP composition by sector gives the percentage contribution of agriculture, industry, 
and services to total GDP. The distribution will total less than 100 percent if the data are 
incomplete.20 
Gross National Income (formerly GNP)  
“GNI is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less 
subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income 
(compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. GNI, calculated in 
national currency, is usually converted to U.S. dollars at official exchange rates for 
comparisons across economies.”21 
GNI Per Capita  
GNI per capita (formerly GNP per capita) is the gross national income divided by the 
midyear population.  
Exports/Imports/Balance of Trade22 
Exports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other market services 
provided to the rest of the world. They include the value of merchandise, freight, 
insurance, transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and other services, such as 
communication, construction, financial, information, business, personal, and government 
services. They exclude labor and property income (formerly called factor services) as well 
as transfer payments. 
Imports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other market services 
received from the rest of the world.  
The balance of trade is the difference in value over a period of time of a country's imports 
and exports of merchandise.23 The balance of trade is favorable (trade surplus), when 
exports exceed imports. Imports exceeding exports is known as trade deficit. 
 
 
                                                 
19
 Worldbank: http://devdata.worldbank.org, accessed on March 29, 2007 
20
 CIA Factbook: https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/docs/notesanddefs.html#2001, accessed on 
March 29, 2007 
21 Worldbank: http://devdata.worldbank.org, accessed on March 29, 2007 
22
 Worldbank: http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/, accessed on March 29, 2007 
23
 Princeton: http://wordnet.princeton.edu/, accessed on March 30, 2007 
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Imports/Exports Partners 
The volume of trade with other countries defines the importance of an import or export 
partner. The most important trade partners are commonly listed in a rank order; the ranks 
are often expressed in percent of total trade volume of a country. 
Gross Capital Formation (in percent of GDP)24 
Gross capital formation (formerly gross domestic investment) consists of total business 
spending on additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the level of 
inventories.  
Fixed assets include land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so on); plant, 
machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, and the like, 
including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial and 
industrial buildings. Inventories are stocks of goods held by firms to meet temporary or 
unexpected fluctuations in production or sales, and “work in progress”. Net acquisitions of 
valuables are also considered capital formation. 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
“FDI is defined as an investment involving a long-term relationship and reflecting a lasting 
interest and control by a resident entity in one economy (foreign direct investor or parent 
enterprise) in an enterprise resident in an economy other than that of the foreign direct 
investor (FDI enterprise or affiliate enterprise or foreign affiliate). FDI implies that the 
investor exerts a significant degree of influence on the management of the enterprise 
resident in the other economy. Such investment involves both the initial transaction 
between the two entities and all subsequent transactions between them and among foreign 
affiliates, both incorporated and unincorporated.  
FDI has three components: equity capital, reinvested earnings and intra-company loans. 
FDI flows are recorded on a net basis (capital account credits less debits between direct 
investors and their foreign affiliates) in a particular year.”25 
Inflows of FDI: Comprises the capital provided by a foreign direct investor to a company 
resident in the economy. 
Outflows of FDI: Comprises the capital provided by a company resident in the economy to 
an enterprise based in another country. 
 
 
                                                 
24
 Worldbank: http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/, accessed on March 29, 2007 
25
 UNCTAD: http://www.unctad.org/Templates/WebFlyer.asp?intItemID=2190&lang=1, accessed on March 
30, 2007 
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Exchange Rates26 
Nominal effective exchange rate indices are calculated by comparing, for each country, the 
change in its own exchange rate against the US dollar to a weighted average of changes in 
its competitors' exchange rates (also against the US dollar), using the weighting matrix for 
the current year (based on the importance of bilateral trade). 
Relative consumer price indices and relative unit labor costs in manufacturing can be 
described as indices of real effective exchange rates. Unlike nominal effective exchange 
rates, they take into account not only changes in market exchange rates, but also variations 
in relative price levels (using, respectively, consumer prices and unit labor costs in 
manufacturing), and therefore can be used as indicators of competitiveness. 
Market capitalization of listed companies27 
Market capitalization (also known as market value) is the share price times the number of 
shares outstanding. Listed domestic companies are the domestically incorporated 
companies listed on the country's stock exchanges at the end of the year. Listed companies 
do not include investment companies, mutual funds, or other collective investment 
vehicles.  
Long Term Interest Rates 28 
These interest rates refer to government bonds with a residual maturity of about ten years. 
They are not the interest rates at which the loans were issued, but the interest rates implied 
by the prices at which the bonds are traded on financial markets.  
Inflation rate/Consumer Price Index 
This indicator as measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator shows 
the rate of price change in the economy as a whole. The GDP implicit deflator is the ratio 
of GDP in current local currency to GDP in constant local currency. It is usually measured  
over one year, five year and ten year periods. Deviations are possible due to the varying 
baskets of goods that underlie the calculations.29 
Remittances from Nationals living Abroad 
Generally, remittance is the flow of funds from migrant workers back to their families in 
their home country. However, there is no universally accepted definition of remittances. 
The IMF definition of remittances goes beyond the definition of transfers as defined in the 
                                                 
26 OECD: http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/ViewHTML.aspx?QueryName=191&QueryType=View&Lang=en, 
accessed on March 31, 2007 
27
 Worldbank: http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/ 
28
 OECD: http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/ViewHTML.aspx?QueryName=191&QueryType=View&Lang=en 
29
 Fischer Weltalmanach (2007): „Abweichungen ergeben sich durch unterschiedliche »Warenkörbe« als 
Berechnungsgrundlage.“ 
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Balance of Payments Manual, Fifth Edition, 1993, which includes workers’ remittances, 
compensation of employees, and migrants’ transfers. 
The IMF definition includes both cross border and domestic transfers. Remittances 
comprise unrequited transfers by workers abroad to their relatives, other household-to-
household transfers, and transfers to/from non-governmental organizations. In addition, 
remittance systems may also be used by citizens and businesses to pay for services (e.g., 
education), investments and goods.30 
1.2.3 National Finance Data 
Budget (revenues/expenses) 
A government budget consists of revenues and expenses during a given period. Revenue is 
generated from taxes, social contributions, fines, fees, rent and income from property or 
sales. Expenses on the other hand comprise all expenditures of a government during a 
given period. If revenues exceed expenses, a budget surplus is reached. However, if the 
expenses outreach the revenues, this is called a budget deficit. A deficit or surplus is 
commonly calculated as the ratio of the government deficit to the GDP.31 
Total Tax Revenue32 
Taxes are defined as compulsory, unrequited payments to general government. They are 
unrequited in the sense that benefits provided by government to taxpayers are not normally 
in proportion to their payments.  
Taxes on incomes and profits cover taxes levied on the net income or profits (gross income 
minus allowable tax reliefs) of individuals and enterprises. They also cover taxes levied on 
the capital gains of individuals and enterprises, and gains from gambling. 
Taxes on goods and services cover all taxes levied on the production, extraction, sale, 
transfer, leasing or delivery of goods, and the rendering of services, or on the use of goods 
or permission to use goods or to perform activities. They consist mainly of value added and 
sales taxes. 
The sum of taxes on goods and services and taxes on income and profits do not equal total 
tax revenues, which also includes payments by employers and employees made under 
compulsory social security schemes as well as payroll taxes, taxes related to the ownership 
and transfer of property, and other taxes. 
 
                                                 
30
 See Ingves, S. (2005), p.6 
31
 See also: Definition of Maastricht Criteria, http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l25014.htm  
32
 OECD: http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/ViewHTML.aspx?QueryName=191&QueryType=View&Lang=en 
 11 
Reserves of Foreign Exchange and Gold 
The reserves of foreign exchange and gold are defined as “the dollar value for the stock of 
all financial assets that are available to the central monetary authority for use in meeting a 
country's balance of payments needs as of the end-date of the period specified. This 
category includes not only foreign currency and gold, but also a country's holdings of 
Special Drawing Rights in the IMF, and its reserve position in the Fund.”33 
Public Debt 
Public debt (also known as government debt or national debt) is money or credit borrowed 
by the government (municipal or local government included34), either from lenders within 
the given country or from foreign lenders, as a result of budget deficits. Governments 
usually borrow money by issuing government bonds or, in developing countries, from 
international financial institutions. Debts of duration until one year are called short term 
debts and debts of ten years or more are considered long term debts. 
Total Debt Service35 
Total debt service is the sum of principal repayments and interest actually paid in foreign 
currency, goods, or services on long-term debt, interest paid on short-term debt and 
repayments (repurchases and charges) to the IMF. Exports of goods and services include 
income and workers' remittances. 
Economic Aid Recipient 
Following the CIA factbook definition, this term, which is subject to major problems of 
definition and statistical coverage, refers to the net inflow of Official Development Finance 
(ODF) to recipient countries. The figure includes assistance from the World Bank, the 
IMF, and other international organizations and from individual nation donors. Formal 
commitments of aid are included in the data. Omitted from the data are grants by private 
organizations. Aid comes in various forms including outright grants and loans. The entry 
thus is the difference between new inflows and repayments. These figures are calculated on 
an exchange rate basis, i.e., not in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms.36 
 
 
                                                 
33
 CIA factbook: https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/docs/notesanddefs.html 
34
 Fischer Weltalmanach (2007): „Schulden der Gebietskörperschaften (Bund, Länder, Gemeinden)“ 
35
 Worldbank: http://devdata.worldbank.org, accessed on March 29, 2007 
36
 CIA factbook: https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/docs/notesanddefs.html,  
    accessed on March 30, 2007 
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1.2.4 Labor Market Data 
Labor Force by Occupation 
Labor force by occupation divides the labor force into the three sectors: agriculture, 
industry and services.37 The distribution will total less than 100 percent if the data are 
incomplete. 
Unemployment Rate 
Unemployment refers to the condition and extent of joblessness within a country, and it is 
measured in terms of the unemployment rate. The unemployment rate of an economy is the 
main indicator for the labor market situation. It is calculated as the number of unemployed 
workers divided by the total civilian labor force. 
Net Migration Rate38 
“The difference between the number of migrants entering and those leaving a country in a 
year, per 1,000 midyear population is called the net migration rate. It may also be 
expressed in percent. A positive figure is known as a net immigration rate and a negative 
figure as a net emigration rate.”39 The net migration rate indicates the contribution of 
migration to the overall level of population change. 
1.2.5 Infrastructure 
Access to Sanitation Facilities 
“Access to improved sanitation facilities refers to the percentage of the population with at 
least adequate access to excreta disposal facilities that can effectively prevent human, 
animal, and insect contact with excreta. Improved facilities range from simple but 
protected pit latrines to flush toilets with a sewerage connection. To be effective, facilities 
must be correctly constructed and properly maintained.”40 
Access to Clean Water 
This indicator refers to the percentage of the population with reasonable access to an 
appropriate amount of water from an improved source (such as household connection, 
borehole, public standpipe, protected well or spring). By contrast, vendors, tanker trucks, 
and unprotected dwells and springs belong to unimproved sources.  
                                                 
37
 AK Austria: http://www1.arbeiterkammer.at/taschenbuch/tbi2006/, accessed on March 29, 2007 
38
 The Net Migration Rate is included in the section “Labor market data” as lack of working opportunities is 
the often the main motivation for people to emigrate. 
39 US Census Bureau: http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/wp96glos.html, accessed on March 29, 2007 
40
 Worldbank: http://devdata.worldbank.org, accessed on March 29, 2007 
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Reasonable access is defined as the availability of at least 20 liters per person a day from a 
source within one kilometer of the home.41 
1.2.6 Gini Index/Human Development Index 
Gini Coefficient (income equality)42,43 
The Gini Index is the most common measure for the degree of inequality in the distribution 
of family income in a nation. The coefficient varies between zero and one, where zero 
reflects complete equality and one complete inequality. The index is calculated from the 
Lorenz curve, in which cumulative family income is plotted against the number of families 
arranged from the poorest to the richest.  
 
Figure 1: The Gini Coefficient44 
 
Graphically, the Gini Coefficient can be easily represented by the area between the Lorenz 
curve and the 45 degree line (line of equality). If income were distributed with perfect 
equality, the Lorenz curve would coincide with the 45 degree line and the index would be 
zero.  
It is sometimes argued that one of the disadvantages of the Gini coefficient is that it is not 
additive across groups. That means the total Gini of a society is not equal to the sum of the 
Ginis for its sub-groups. 
 
                                                 
41
 Worldbank: http://devdata.worldbank.org, accessed on March 29, 2007 
42
 See CIA Factbook: https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/docs/notesanddefs.html#2001, accessed 
on March 31, 2007 
43
 See Worldbank: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTPA/0,, 
contentMDK:20238991~menuPK:492138~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:430367,00.html, 
accessed on March 31, 2007 
44
 Source: World Bank 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTPA/0,,contentMDK:202389
91~menuPK:435055~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:430367,00.html, accessed on March 9, 2007 
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Human Development Index45 
The human development index (HDI) is published annually by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) that looks beyond GDP to a broader definition of well-
being. The HDI provides a composite measure of three dimensions of human development: 
living a long and healthy life (measured by life expectancy), being educated (measured by 
adult literacy and enrolment at the primary, secondary and tertiary level) and having a 
decent standard of living (measured by PPP, income). The index is not in any sense a 
comprehensive measure of human development. It does not, for example, include 
important indicators such as inequality and difficult to measure indicators like respect for 
human rights and political freedoms.  
1.2.7 Corruption Perception Index (CPI)46 
The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries in terms of 
the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians. 
It is a composite index, a poll of polls, drawing on corruption-related data from expert and 
business surveys carried out by a variety of independent and reputable institutions. The 
CPI focuses on corruption in the public sector and defines corruption as the abuse of public 
office for private gain. The surveys used in compiling the CPI ask questions that relate to 
the misuse of public power for private benefit, for example bribery of public officials, 
kickbacks in public procurement, embezzlement of public funds or questions that probe the 
strength of anti-corruption policies, thereby encompassing both administrative and political 
corruption. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
45
 UNDP: http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/, accessed on March 30, 2007 
46
 See Transparency International: http://www.transparency.org 
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2 NAFTA and EU 
As already mentioned above, NAFTA and EU have some characteristics in common, 
above all regarding economic issues. However, the two represent two different degrees of 
economic integration, with NAFTA being a FTA and the EU being a single market and 
partly a monetary union.  
In this chapter the developments as well as the main characteristics of NAFTA and EU will 
be presented. 
2.1 NAFTA 
“In June 1990, Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari and US President George H. 
W. Bush announced a daring initiative: the creation of a free trade area between the United 
States and Mexico.”47 By that time Canada and the US had already signed a bilateral 
FTA48, which had been in place since 1989. When formal negotiations for the new FTA 
started in 1991, Canada decided to join the NAFTA project as well. The North American 
Free Trade Agreement was signed by the United States, Canada and Mexico on December 
17, 1992, after 14 months of negotiations. The agreement entered into force on January 1, 
1994. By that time, “NAFTA represented a $6 trillion economy with a population of 360 
million. Ten years later, the NAFTA area grew to a $12.5 trillion economy with a 
population of 430 million.”49 
The economic integration in North America did not only start with CUSFTA or NAFTA: 
the United States already accounted for the major share of trade and FDI in Canada and 
Mexico before any FTA had been signed. However, NAFTA represented for the United 
States an opportunity to take advantage of a growing export market to the south, but also a 
political chance to turn Mexico into a politically stable neighbour country. It should not be 
omitted that the Mexican-US border and the illegal immigration into the United States 
have always been huge bilateral issues and that the US also hoped for declining 
immigration flows from Mexico into the United States with NAFTA being in place.  
 
                                                 
47
 Hufbauer, Gary Clyde and Schott, Jeffrey J.(2005), p.1 
48
 CUSFTA: Canada-US Free Trade Agreement 
49
 Hufbauer, Gary Clyde and Schott, Jeffrey J.(2005), p.1 
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2.1.1 Objectives 
According to Article 102 of NAFTA50, the member states had the following objectives and 
goals: 
“The objectives of this Agreement, as elaborated more specifically through its principles 
and rules, including national treatment, most-favored-nation treatment and transparency, 
are to:  
 Eliminate barriers to trade in, and facilitate the cross-border movement of, goods 
and services between the territories of the Parties;  
 Promote conditions of fair competition in the free trade area;  
 Increase substantially investment opportunities in the territories of the Parties;  
 Provide adequate and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property 
rights in each Party's territory;  
 Create effective procedures for the implementation and application of this 
Agreement, for its joint administration and for the resolution of disputes; and  
 Establish a framework for further trilateral, regional and multilateral cooperation to 
expand and enhance the benefits of this Agreement.” 
2.1.2 Contents of the Agreement 
The agreement consists of a preamble and eight parts, covering tariffs and market access, 
non-tariff-measures, rules of origin, investment and dispute settlement, services, 
competition policy, monopolies and state enterprises, the energy sector, labor market, 
exceptions and final provisions. 
After renegotiations under the Clinton administration, three side agreements were included 
into the agreement: North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, North 
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation and North American Agreement on Import 
Surges. 
Two important principles the NAFTA members agreed on are national treatment and most-
favored-nation (MFN) treatment: National treatment means that goods from one member 
country imported to another member country are entitled to the same treatment as a 
national good in the importing country. MFN treatment means that goods imported from 
                                                 
50
 OAS: http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/naftatce.
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one member country into another member country are not treated less favourably than any 
other goods of other countries. 
 Tariff Elimination 
All tariffs on goods originating from the United States, Canada and Mexico were either 
eliminated immediately or were phased out over five or ten years. Tariffs on certain 
economically or politically sensitive items are being phased out over fifteen years. By 2009 
all tariffs between the three countries should be abolished. 
 Market Access 
Non-tariff measures such as import licences and quotas were eliminated as well. Still, each 
member country reserved the right to restrict trade in the areas of health, environment, 
agricultural products, automotive and energy-related products.  
 Country of Origin 
Strict rules of origin ensure that only goods and services produced or sufficiently 
transformed in a NAFTA country benefit from the agreement. For some goods51 a 
specified percentage of North American content is required to be considered as “made in 
NAFTA“. These rules intend to ensure that non-members do not gain duty-free access to 
NAFTA members by building plants in one NAFTA country and then exporting duty-free 
to the other member countries.  
 Investment 
Significant investment barriers were removed and mechanisms for dispute settlements 
provided. Furthermore intellectual property52 is protected, and NAFTA investors can 
convert local currency into foreign currency at the prevailing market rate of exchange. 
Investments are also protected from expropriation, except expropriation serves a public 
purpose and is compensated at a fair market value. 
 Services 
Services have been completely liberalized, this can be clearly seen in financial services 
where Mexico opened up to foreign investors and Canadian and US firms are now 
authorized to own Mexican companies and also Mexican banks and insurance companies. 
 
                                                 
51
 Products of the automotive sector require „local content“ of 62.5%. 
52
 e.g.: Patents, copyrights, trademarks, sound recordings, computer software, etc. 
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 Competition Policy, Monopolies and State Enterprises 
The agreement opened a significant portion of the government procurement market to 
suppliers on a non-discriminatory basis for goods, and engineering and construction 
services.53  
 Energy Sector 
Mexico did not liberalize its energy sector; it avoided liberalization of oil, gas, refining, 
basic petrochemicals, the nuclear sector and the electricity sector. The oil industry 
remained under state control. However, the other NAFTA investors may acquire, establish 
and operate facilities in some restricted areas.54  
 Labor Market 
NAFTA is no common market, thus there is no free movement of labor. Each member 
country maintained its rights to protect the permanent employment base of its domestic 
labor force, to implement its own immigration policies, and to pursue independent border 
security politics.  
 Exceptions 
Although trade was liberalized significantly, the member states agreed upon restrictions in 
many areas: these restrictions concern for example the textile sector, the automotive sector, 
agriculture and state monopolies on energy.  
 Final Provisions 
After a cancellation period of six months each member state is allowed to withdraw from 
the NAFTA. Moreover each country willing to accept the NAFTA regulations may be 
accepted as a member state.  
2.2 EU 55 
In contrast to NAFTA, the European Union has never consisted of one single agreement on 
free trade. Free trade is only one part of what defines the EU. As already addressed in the 
introduction, European countries had deep political reasons for economic integration after 
                                                 
53
 This rule does not apply to the procurement of arms, ammunition and weapons or to other national security 
procurements. 
54
 These areas include: nonbasic petrochemical goods, electricity-generating facilities for „own use“, 
cogeneration and independent power production. 
55
 See: Pfetsch, F. (2005) 
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the Second World War. Already back in 1946 Winston Churchill56 stated: “We must build 
a kind of United States of Europe“57.  
However, economic integration was the most effective way to get closer, and the first step 
was undertaken by the French foreign secretary Robert Schuman who proposed the 
foundation of the ECSC. The treaty was signed in 1951. Seven years later, on March 25, 
1957, the six founding members deepened their relationships with the signature of the 
Treaty of Rome, which is now known as the cornerstone of the EU58. The treaty included 
the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic 
Energy Community (EURATOM). In 1959 tariffs were reduced by 10 percent for the first 
time within the EEC. In 1967 the three institutions merged to become the European 
Community (EC). One year later the customs union and a common external tariff were 
introduced. In 1973 the first enlargement took place and Great Britain, Ireland and 
Denmark entered the EC. In the mid-eighties the first Schengen Agreement was signed, 
opening the way to abolish systematic boarder controls between the signing nations.59 A 
few months later the Single European Act (SEA) which was the first major revision of the 
Treaty of Rome, was signed. The act set the goal of establishing a single market until 1992. 
For a long time, EC members had also thought about monetary integration but the 
implementation had already failed a few times. In 1989 the Delors Report60 suggested three 
steps to establish the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The first step was realized in 
1990 by abolishing all exchange controls and completely liberalizing capital movements 
within the EC. Later, convergence criteria were set in the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) 
concerning inflation rate, public finances, interest rates and exchange rate stability. A 
stability and growth pact was put into place and the European Central Bank (ECB) was 
founded in Frankfurt. As a last step twelve nations adopted the Euro as their common 
currency (Slovenia joined later).61  
The Treaty of Maastricht, formally called the Treaty on European Union62 (TEU), was 
signed on February 7, 1992. It introduced the three pillars of the EU, namely the European 
Communities pillar, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar, and the 
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 UK Prime Minister 
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 http://www.europa-web.de/europa/02wwswww/202histo/churchil.htm, accessed on April 1, 2007 
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 On March 25, 2007 the EU officially celebrated its 50 year anniversary 
59
 Originally the signing nations were Belgium, France, West Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands 
60
 Jacques Delors was the President of the European Commission at the time 
61
 Every member country fulfilling the convergence criteria and being in the European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM II) for two years may adopt the Euro. 
62
 Text of the Treaty: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html, accessed on April 1, 
2007 
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Justice and Home Affairs pillar. The first pillar, concentrating on the EMU, is the most 
integrated one, led by the supranational principle. As Pfetsch63 points out, the economic 
area which has been the heart of the efforts for European integration since the Schuman-
plan, the ECSC and the EEC, remains the most developed area concerning integration 
thanks to its movement towards supranationalism64. 
In 1993 the single European market was completed65 and one year later the convergence 
criteria came into effect. 
As a reaction to unfavorable economic developments and high unemployment rates, the 
Heads of State launched the “Lisbon Strategy” in March 2000 aimed at making the EU the 
most competitive economy in the world and achieving full employment by 2010. In 2004, 
the treaty for a European Constitution was signed by the member states. 
Major events in recent years have been the biggest EU enlargement in its history in 2004, 
with Poland being one of the new EU members, the rejection of the European Constitution 
by France and the Netherlands66, and the entry of Rumania and Bulgaria in 2007. 
At the moment the EU counts 27 member countries with a population of 494 million and a 
$12.6 trillion economy, according to Eurostat and the World Bank. 
2.3 Differences between the Two 
The different degrees of integration already suggest some fundamental differences between 
NAFTA and EU. The most striking distinction lies definitely in the question of how far 
integration shall go. The NAFTA members generally agree that no sovereignty shall be 
ceded to supranational institutions67. Within the EU there have always existed various 
opinions about the depth of integration. Some countries such as Great Britain and Denmark 
would have welcomed a limitation to a FTA, while other countries such as Germany and 
the Benelux countries often acted as motors of new initiatives for deeper integration.  
More specifically, there are some key areas with great differences such as factor movement 
(and border control), monetary policy or economic aid for underdeveloped regions. 
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 Pfetsch, F. (2005), p.61-62: “Der ökonomische Bereich, der seit dem Schuman-Plan, der EGKS und der 
EWG den Kern der europäischen Integrationsbemühungen ausgemacht hatte, blieb durch den Sprung zum 
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64 The supranational institutions of the EMU are: European Commission, Council of the EU, European 
Council, European Parliament, European Court of Justice 
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 See Appendix I for an illustration 
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 The constitution was rejected in referendums conducted in these countries. 
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 However, big parts of literature advocate deeper NAFTA integration concerning e.g. monetary policy and 
dispute settlement. 
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Within the EU, factor movement is free. There are however some exceptions, like the 
example of Germany and Austria who negotiated transition periods with respect to free 
movement of persons from the new EU member countries. Hence, one could see this as a 
similarity between Mexico’s migration situation within NAFTA and Poland’s migration 
situation within the EU. In both cases, remittances are important parts of the national GDP. 
Still, within NAFTA no common border policies exist, while the EU has indeed adapted 
common border policies, they have just not been fully implemented yet. 
As a side note it is interesting to mention that Spain, Portugal and Greece who entered the 
EEC in the 1980s, had big emigration flows into the EEC before their membership. After 
their entry these emigration flows decreased significantly and even became negative in 
some cases. In the case of NAFTA where a major goal of the US had been to decrease 
immigration from Mexico, the contrary was the case and Mexican emigration to the US 
continued to rise after 1994.68 
Monetary policy is very different between the EU and NAFTA. Within NAFTA, the 
Canadian Dollar and the Mexican Peso float freely against the US Dollar, “Bilateral real 
exchange rates have fluctuated strongly and have exhibited persistent trends.”69 According 
to the importance of sovereignty, monetary policy lies in the hands of the national central 
banks. In the EU, the supranational ECB is responsible for monetary policy (at least 
concerning monetary politics of the Euro zone). Besides, all EU member countries 
participate in the EMU, whose long term goal is to make the Euro the only EU currency. 
All countries who have not yet adopted the Euro70 are in an exchange rate mechanism 
(ERM II) that shall provide stability between the Euro and the remaining national 
currencies.  
Another topic with special interest regarding Mexico and Poland are subsidies for 
agriculture and aids for economically less developed regions. Big parts of the EU budget 
go into the support of European agriculture and into structural funds that aim at helping 
poorer EU regions reach convergence with richer regions more rapidly. Poland profits 
from both, as its primary sector is the biggest in the entire EU and as the whole country has 
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 See Eaton, G. (1996), p.124 
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 Coiteux, M. (2003), p.65 
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 Great Britain, Denmark and Sweden have not accepted the Euro and still use their national currencies; the      
    new EU members (except Slovenia) are currently in the second step of the EMU. 
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been receiving structural funds. Within NAFTA, the focus “is trade, not aid. The assumed 
financial benefits to Mexico are from increased investment”71. 
In-depth analysis on Mexico and Poland will be given in part II and III, however this short 
overview illustrates that several factors need to be kept in mind when comparing these two 
countries and their evolution within the respective trade blocs.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
71
 Eaton, G. (1996), p.134 
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Part II 
3 Mexico’s Development  
 
 
Figure 2: Short overview and map of Mexico72 
 
 
Mesoamerica has been home to civilizations such as the Maya and the Aztecs for almost 
three thousand years. In 1519, the territory that is now known as Mexico was invaded by 
Spanish conquerors. It became the viceroyalty of New Spain and developed into the largest 
provider of resources for the Spanish empire, and into the most populated Spanish colony.  
In 1810, Miguel Hidalgo declared Mexico independent from Spain. A long war followed 
and in 1821 the independence was finally recognized and the First Mexican Empire 
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 CIA factbook: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mx.html, accessed on 
June 4, 2007 
Estados Unidos Mexicanos 
Total area: 
Border countries: 
Population: 
Population growth rate: 
Languages: 
Capital: 
 
1 972 550 sq km 
Belize 250 km, Guatemala 962 km, US 3141 km 
108 700 891 (July 2007 est.) 
1,153% (2007 est.) 
Spanish, Indigenous languages (Mayan, Nahuatl, etc.) 
Mexico City (Ciudad de Mexico) 
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established. In 1836, Texas declared its independence from Mexico, and some years later it 
was annexed by the United States. This provoked a border conflict that culminated in the 
Mexican-American War (1846-1848). Mexico was defeated by the United States and lost 
one third of its territory to its war opponent. In the 1860s France occupied Mexico, and the 
Habsburg Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian of Austria was installed as Emperor 
Maximilian I of Mexico. In 1867, the previous president of the Republic, Benito Juárez, 
was able to restore the republic.  
The president who succeeded Benito Juárez, Porfirio Díaz, ruled from 1876 until 1911, the 
long period of his rule is even known as Porfiriato. This era was marked by big economic 
achievements, investments in art and sciences but also by huge economic inequality and 
political repression. During the Porfiriato the US replaced Spain as Mexico’s main trading 
partner. Porfirio Díaz’ rule ended with the outbreak of the Mexican Revolution and the 
subsequent civil war, which lasted until 192173 and cost the lives of 900 000 people. By the 
end of the revolution, a new constitution was introduced, which guaranteed, besides others, 
the just distribution of land to the Mexicans, and the strict secularization of the country. In 
the aftermath of the revolution, the National Revolutionary Party was founded. The party 
was later renamed into Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) and has ruled Mexico 
for 70 years.  
The evolution towards a solid democracy was rather slow. However, the rupture of the 
PRI-domination was peaceful, and in 2000 the candidate of the opposition party Partido 
Acción Nacional (PAN), Vicente Fox, was elected the first non-PRI president since the 
Mexican Revolution.  
At the moment, President Felipe Calderón from PAN governs Mexico. He was elected in 
July, 2006, in an extremely narrow victory over the candidate from the Partido de la 
Revolución Democrática (PRD), Andrés Manuel López Obrador. The PRI only obtained 
the third place.  
3.1 Economic Development in Mexico until 1994 74 
Mexico’s recent economic development was roller coaster like, from spectacular growth in 
the middle of the century, down to galloping inflation and terrific accumulated debts in the 
1980s, up again to big economic growth in the beginning of the 1990s. In the following 
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section, the country’s economic development until the peso crisis of 1994 will be 
presented. The GDP development of Mexico between 1940 and 2001 can be found in 
Appendix II. 
3.1.1 El Milagro Mexicano (1940s until 1970s) 
During the decades following the revolution (1940s until 1970s) and already under the rule 
of President Lázaro Cárdenas75, Mexico experienced big economic growth (called El 
Milagro Mexicano, the Mexican Miracle, by some): The agrarian reform promised in the 
constitution was pursued further, the oil industry was nationalized76 and a reallocation in 
favour of the poor population’s income took place; all these measures had positive effects 
on the development of the domestic market. During this period, the Mexican GDP grew at 
an average annual rate of 6, 5%, and the income per capita grew at an average of 3% per 
year77.  
Mexico, like many other poor countries at that time, held to an economic policy of Import 
Substitution Industrialization (ISI).78 As the name suggests, a nation tries to substitute 
imports by fostering local production and by setting up high tariffs on imports. This 
implies strong intervention of the state in economic affairs. Mexico, with its huge domestic 
market and the corporatist structures built up by the PRI, was quite successful with this 
model for some time.  
However, the linkage effects were small, and big parts of the import substitution industry 
remained dependent on the imports of raw material and intermediate goods from abroad. 
This, combined with Mexico’s technological dependence on other countries, explains the 
more and more unfavourable balance of trade. Furthermore, industrial production remained 
capital intensive and relatively unproductive. Many products suffered from quality defects. 
This development was only able to continue - for quite a long time and without severe 
consequences for the entrepreneurship - thanks to the Mexican government, which 
intervened regularly and granted subsidies and rescue plans every time a company was 
stuck in difficulties.79  
Some social indicators such as literacy rate and life expectancy improved over this period. 
However, one of the most important indicators, income distribution, was stuck at the same 
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level as some decades before. The deficits of Mexican policy became visible during the 
presidency of Luis Echeverría (1970-1976) and José López Portillo (1976-1982)80.  
3.1.2 Sexenio of Luis Echeverría (1970 until 1976) 
The presidency of Echeverría was marked by low private investment rates (the main 
investments came from the state), huge amounts of capital flight and a growing budget 
deficit. Mexico accumulated debts, and the inflation accelerated. One consequence was the 
lifting of the parity between the USD and the Mexican Peso (MXN), and the 80% 
devaluation of the peso. According to Imbusch81, “In 1976, Mexico was at the peak of its 
deepest economic crisis since 1929”.  
3.1.3 Sexenio of José López Portillo (1976 until 1982) 
The next president, José López Portillo, could initially rely upon the oil “El Dorado” that 
fully flourished by the end of the 1970s. Between 1977 and 1981 the GDP grew at an 
annual rate of 8%, the oil sector and the industry grew even faster. Unfortunately, the 
abundance of oil and the new hopes associated with it “incited a false feeling of welfare in 
the country. Mexican state-owned companies and the Mexican government itself had 
borrowed more from foreign banks than any other developing country in the world. The 
external debt quadrupled between 1976 and 1982.”82  
By 1982 Mexico suspended its debt service due to illiquidity and an economic crisis broke 
out that was to last for the whole decade. Various reasons exist for the outbreak of the 
crisis: First of all, oil prices plunged by 1981. This had disastrous consequences for 
Mexico, whose oil products accounted for 70% of all exports.  At the same time the world 
interest rates rose, which made the debt payback much more expensive. The situation 
encouraged capital flight as well and in 1981, an estimated amount of 10 billion USD left 
the country83. In order to resolve the crisis, President Portillo devalued the peso and 
nationalized the banking system, along with many other industries that were affected by 
the crisis (e.g. steel industry).  
The crisis was also an indicator for the failure of the concept of import substitution. On the 
one hand, the system had helped industrialize the country, and it had provided political 
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stability over decades. On the other hand, it had produced an uncompetitive industrial 
sector with low productivity gains. In 1981 for example, the 27 biggest state owned 
companies made deficits as big as 8,9% of the GDP. This represented 60% of the total 
budget deficit.84 
3.1.4 Sexenio of Miguel de la Madrid (1982 until 1988) 
By the end of 1982, a new president was elected, Miguel de la Madrid. His sexenio was 
characterized by the permanent pressure of IMF on Mexico and the President’s efforts to 
conduct crisis management. He was the first to introduce liberal reforms: The external 
trade was liberalized step by step, the maquiladora industry85 was pushed and big parts of 
the state owned industry were privatized. Thanks to the plunging oil prices, the export 
structure was diversified, and the automotive industry, the processed food industry, as well 
as the chemical industry became dynamic export sectors. The maquiladora industry also 
accounted for big parts of the exports. By 1986 Mexico joined the GATT. 
However, the debt policy of Miguel de la Madrid’s government did not show great success, 
the poverty rate86 augmented from 32% in 1981 to 41% in 1987, the distribution of income 
was more unbalanced than ever, and the unprecedented inflation rate of 130% by 1987 
falls in his presidency, too.  In the light of the galloping inflation rate and the upcoming 
presidential elections, a pact – called the Pacto de Solidaridad Económica - was agreed 
upon, whose most important measure included a spectacular wage and prize freeze. 
As Figure 3 illustrates, inflation reached various peaks during the 1980s, coinciding with 
the big economic crises of 1982 and 1988. Until 1994 it could be drastically reduced, only 
to explode by 1995, where it reached another maximum of 35% p.a. From that year on, 
inflation could be constantly reduced and by 2006 it was at the very low level of 3,6%. 
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Figure 3:  Mexico's inflation from 1980 until 199587 
 
3.1.5 Sexenio of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988 until 1994) 
The next president, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, continued this pact (under a different name) 
which started to show success by the end of the decade. In 1988, inflation settled at 2% per 
month, and the 20% inflation rate of the following year was the lowest since 1982. One of 
Salinas’ most important measures to reach a budget balance was his fiscal policy. He 
introduced a tax on capital and made a bigger percentage of the population pay income 
taxes. Furthermore, fines for defraudation of tax were raised. Another focus of Salinas’ 
policy towards a balanced budget was to privatize state owned companies. In an impressive 
move towards deregulation, practically all state owned companies were transformed into 
private companies between 1982 and 1994. The notable exceptions were the oil industry 
and the energy sector which remained state-owned. The estimated 26 billion USD earned 
from these privatizations were mostly used for internal debt reduction.  The public debt 
could be reduced from 62,4% of GDP in 1988 to 22% of GDP in 1994. On the other hand 
it can be said, that rather small parts of the population profited from the deregulation: In 
the sexenio of Salinas de Gortari the number of billionaires rose from 2 to 24, which can be 
easily explained by the favourable acquisition conditions of the state companies; on the 
other hand these companies often remained in monopolistic positions, which led to price 
increases but not always to quality increases88.  
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The liberalization of the finance sector was also started during this period, partly due to 
Mexico’s obligations that came along with its entry into the GATT. The 18 state-owned 
banks were completely privatized, which earned the government 13 billion USD, a 
multiple of what it had paid some years before under President Portillo, when the banking 
system had been nationalized. Furthermore the Law for the Regulation of Financial Groups 
was passed, which allowed a single holding company to provide a variety of financial 
services (i.e. banking, brokerage and insurance services). Deposit and lending rates were 
liberalized, too. 
The so-called “Brady Plan” helped Mexico reduce its external debts considerably: By 
1989/1990 the US Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas Brady presented a plan to resolve the 
debt problems of many deeply indebted nations, including Mexico: Mexico’s external debt 
was shifted from private creditors to public creditors who provided improved pay back 
conditions.89  
The losers of this newly introduced liberalism and those impoverished by the economic 
crisis of the 1980s were aimed at with a government program called PRONASOL 
(Programa Nacional de Solidaridad), a programme of national solidarity. Besides the 
political propaganda of this programme (it should help raise the popularity rates of the PRI 
government within the poor population), its goals were to improve national health, 
infrastructure, employment and regional aid. The programme differentiated itself from 
other social programmes in defining itself as unbureaucratic, close to the people, 
participative, decentralized, independent and pluralistic. The programme was in effect 
more efficient than precedent programmes; however, the claim of independence from 
political interests cannot be confirmed. It is not very credible that the mounting number of 
projects before elections was pure coincidence. Hence it comes as no surprise that 
PRONASOL is closely related to the person of President Salinas de Gortari in Mexico. 
Interestingly, this programme was a great “marketing” success, although it did not really 
allocate more money than all the earlier projects. In 1992 the programme was integrated 
into the ministry of social affairs (SEDESOL – Secretaría de Desarrollo Social).90 
3.1.6 Starting the NAFTA project 
What had already begun in the early eighties with President Miguel de la Madrid, 
developed into a clear focus on “market opening” (apertura) under his successor Carlos 
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Salinas de Gortari. The further opening of the Mexican economy and the commitment to 
its northern neighbours Canada and the US culminated in the announcement of the FTA 
(Free Trade Agreement) between the three countries in 1990. On December 18, 1992, the 
North American Free Trade Agreement was signed between the United States (under 
President George H. W. Bush), Canada (under Prime Minister Brian Mulroney) and 
Mexico (under President Carlos Salinas de Gortari). It came into effect on January 1, 1994, 
after the signature of three additional supplements on environment, labor standards and 
import surges, required by the newly elected US President Bill Clinton.91 
“On the same day, Zapatista rebels in the Southern Mexican state of Chiapas launched 
their uprising. Within a year, Mexico would be in financial crisis, and the Clinton 
administration would ask congress to bail out its new free trade partner.”92 
3.1.7 The 1994 Crisis 
1994 did not only mark the beginning of NAFTA, but also the beginning of Salinas de 
Gortari’s last year in office. In a long existing Mexican tradition, Salinas planned a 
glorious exit. He chose his successor93, and irresponsibly raised government spending, 
since it was election year, and the PRI was to win again.  
The combination of fixing the exchange rate, which led to a quick overvaluation of the 
MXN and increasing consumer spending, led to a rising current account deficit. To help 
finance the deficit which had already reached 7% of GDP in 1994, the issuing of public 
debt instruments called tesobonos was authorized by Salinas. Tesobonos were short term 
bills denominated in MXN but with a currency adjustment clause that insured repayment in 
USD (the clause assured the attraction of foreign investors). Furthermore, strict price 
controls were introduced and smaller minimum wage increments negotiated with labor 
unions in order to curb inflation. This strategy led to a reduction in inflation, however, 
growth only averaged 2,8% p.a. 
One year later the growth would even reach a negative record. The following graph very 
well depicts how GDP grew constantly from the 1987 crisis on until 1994, when GDP 
growth started to fall sharply, until it reached a value of -6,2% in 1995. The course of the 
1995 economic crisis is explained below. 
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Figure 4: GDP growth in Mexico from 1980 until 199594 
 
The first crisis of the year, the Zapatista rebellion that broke out in January, had little to do 
with the latest Salinas policies and had only weak links with NAFTA. However, the chosen 
date for the beginning of the rebellion was symbolic, as it coincided with NAFTA’s entry 
into force. This rebellion also highlights the inequality within Mexico as the rebellion was 
led by big parts of the indigenous population, who protested against their weak position 
within Mexican society.95 
Another negative climax was the assassination of the PRI candidate for the presidential 
election, Luis Donaldo Colosio, in March, when campaigning in Tijuana. Until today, the 
exact reasons for this murder remain unclear. Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León was 
nominated by the PRI to take Colosio’s place. 
Meanwhile, the current account deficit widened and nervous investors took their money 
out of Mexico and sold their tesobonos. Consequently, the central bank (Banco de Mexico) 
reserves were depleted. Until the new president was elected, the Banco de Mexico 
maintained the fixed exchange rate and purchased Mexican Treasury securities in big 
volumes to stave off the rocketing inflation.  
The crisis broke out as soon as Ernesto Zedillo was inaugurated as the new President. In a 
first step, the MXN was devalued by 15%. Two days later, as this policy could not be held, 
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the government allowed the peso to float freely.96 Accordingly, the peso collapsed from 3,4 
to 7,2 per USD. Prices soared 24% in the first months of 1995. 
In contrast to preceding economic crises, this time the international community and the US 
in particular were quick to help Mexico. “The Clinton administration crafted an 
international financial rescue package of historic proportion and committed the United 
States to almost $20 billion in immediate US assistance to Mexico, plus $30 billion from 
other sources – despite opposition in Congress and reservations by key donors in the 
IMF.”97 
The Mexican responses to the crisis were strict controls on monetary and fiscal policy. 
This approach was backed by NAFTA obligations, and detained Mexico from introducing 
trade and capital controls, which had been the approaches to former crises. The booming 
exports helped cope with the crisis as well. 
Within less than 18 months, the economy was growing again. By 1996 the US loans were 
fully repaid, even ahead of schedule.  
“The IMF, together with the US government, has played an important role in helping the 
Mexican government deal with the crisis. […] Mexico received considerable support 
because, at that moment, it was illiquid but solvent. As Sachs points out, ‘Not many 
countries share a 2000 mile border with the IMF’s largest shareholder’”.98 
3.2 Reasons for joining NAFTA 
Under the neoliberal strategies of the eighties, started by Miguel de la Madrid and 
reinforced by Salinas de Gortari, it was only logical to strive for foreign investment as it 
was regarded as necessary in order to reduce the external deficit, to attract new 
technologies and to boost productivity. Mexico’s laws were relatively restrictive towards 
FDI, as some sectors could only be owned by the Mexican state, others only by Mexican 
nationals. In other sectors foreign investment was limited to 49%. The NAFTA was an 
adequate framework to change these laws rapidly towards equal status of foreign investors. 
Another important motivation to sign a FTA with the US was the long established 
importance of the northern neighbour for Mexico’s trade. By the time of the negotiations, 
the US accounted for two thirds of Mexico’s external trade, and the numbers were still 
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increasing.99 Many studies, produced before NAFTA came into effect, predicted a strong 
opportunity for Mexican exports (apparel, cement, glass, steel, shoes). Hence, Mexico 
wanted to support and intensify its access to the important US market by introducing free 
trade.   
Furthermore, the global economy seemed to become more integrated: As the Soviet bloc 
collapsed the new market economy countries of Eastern Europe were immediately 
embraced by Western Europe. “Not only the collapse of socialist regimes in Eastern and 
Central Europe, but also the transition of those countries to pro-Western, market-oriented 
economies raised worrisome prospects of compelling, previously unanticipated, sources of 
new competition for Mexico in trade and investment”100, as Gentleman and Zubek put it. It 
seemed logical and necessary to the Mexican government to push the North American 
integration in order to stay competitive in a global context. 
Interestingly, there was little opposition against NAFTA within Mexico. After a long 
economic crisis many believed the liberalization of Mexico’s economy was the right 
answer and would bring welfare to the people. This can be seen as another reason for the 
Mexican government to join NAFTA. It increased the PRI’s popularity.  
                                                 
99
 See Boris, D. (1996), p.88 
100
 Gentleman, J. and Zubek, V. (1992), p.74 
 34 
4 Poland’s Development  
 
 
Figure 5: Short overview and map of Poland101 
 
In Late Antiquity, the regions now known as Poland were mainly populated by Slavic, 
Celtic, Baltic and German tribes.102 
The first Polish state was created in 966, when Poland’s first documented ruler, Mieszko I, 
was baptized. Its boundaries were quite similar to Poland’s current borders. In the 11th 
century it became a kingdom, and in 1569 the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was 
established. As the country expanded and flourished, “contemporaries and later generations 
called the Jagiellonian era, especially the 16th century, their Golden Age.”103  
By the 18th century, the Commonwealth had to fight severe internal problems and was 
increasingly exposed to foreign attacks. Attempts to reform the country came late and by 
the end of the century, Poland was partitioned between Russia, Prussia and Austria. From 
1795 until 1918, the country ceased to exist.104  
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Republic of Poland 
 
Total area: 
312,685 sq km  
Border countries: 
Belarus 416 km, Czech Republic 790 km, 
Germany 467 km, Lithuania 103 km, 
Russia  
210 km, Slovakia 541 km, Ukraine 529 km 
Population: 
38,518,241 (July 2007 est.) 
Population growth rate: 
-0.046% (2007 est.) 
Official Language: 
Polish 
Capital: 
Warsaw (Warszawa) 
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The reestablishment of Poland in 1918 was agreed upon by the Allies of the First World 
War. US president Wilson105 had previously set up a fourteen point list, where the 
reconstitution of Poland appeared as point number thirteen. De facto, “independent Poland 
emerged from the collapse of the three partitioning powers at the end of the First World 
War.”106  
During this period Poland gained its first experience as democracy. However, in May 
1926, Józef Piłsudski107 staged a military coup d’état, after a period of economic crisis and 
political instability. His rule was marked by a strong emphasis on the military and had 
clear dictatorial traits. After Piłsudski’s death in 1935, power remained in the hands of the 
military. This period is known as “rule of the Colonels”108.  
By 1938, Poland had serious diplomatic conflicts with Germany, which was already under 
national socialist rule. Germany reclaimed the free city of Gdask (Danzig), and in August 
1939, the German-Soviet Pact of Non-Aggression was signed, which sealed Poland’s fate 
for the next decades: In a secret annex, the spheres of interest were divided between 
Germany and the Soviet Union, including the division of Poland. On September 1, 1939, 
German troops entered Poland, two weeks later Soviet troops coming from the east, 
followed. Warsaw surrendered on September 28. On September 3, France and Great 
Britain declared war on Germany. As Anita Pramowska puts it, “The German attack on 1 
September opened the most tragic chapter in recent Polish history. […] Displacement and 
genocide decreased Poland’s population by one-fourth in relation to its pre-war levels. […] 
The war destroyed most of Poland’s industrial infrastructure so painfully developed during 
the inter-war period.”109 
At the end of the war, Poland’s borders were shifted westwards, pushing the eastern border 
to the Curzon line and the western border to the Oder-Neisse line. Eastern territories were 
transferred to the Soviet Union and western territories from Germany to Poland. The 
country found itself entirely within the Soviet sphere of influence, and was gradually cut 
off from the Western world. The first government after the Second World War included 
Communists (PPR), left-wing socialists (PPS) and the Peasant Alliance (PSL). 
Nevertheless, all key posts were under communist control. Soon a communist regime was 
installed, analogous to the rest of the Eastern Bloc, and Poland became a Soviet satellite 
                                                 
105
 Thomas Woodrow Wilson was the 28th president of the US. He was in office from 1913 until 1921. 
106
 Pramowska, A. (2004), p.162 
107
 Józef Piłsudski was a Field Marshal and Poland’s first Chief of State between 1918 and 1922. 
108
 Pramowska, A. (2004), p.170 
109
 Pramowska, A. (2004), p.177 
 36 
state. The People’s Republic of Poland was officially declared in 1952. As the cold war 
emerged, Poland also became part of the Warsaw Pact, signed in its capital in 1955. 
In 1980, labor turmoil led to the formation of the Solidarno (solidarity) movement, an 
independent trade union, which developed into an important political force. In the 1989 
election it defeated the communists and Lech Wałsa, one of the movement’s leaders, 
became the first post-communist president of Poland. The Polish development was a herald 
for the succeeding collapse of communism across Eastern Europe.  
Since the end of communism, Poland has passed through an intensive phase of 
democratization and economic transition. Important steps towards a free market economy 
and democracy were the membership of OECD from 1996 on, the entry into NATO in 
1999 and the entry into the European Union in 2004. 
At the moment, Poland is ruled by the national conservative party “Law and Justice” 
(PiS)110. Lech Aleksander Kaczyski is Poland’s current president, he was elected in 2005. 
His twin brother, Jarosław Kaczyski, has been the country’s prime minister since July 
2006.   
4.1 Economic Development in Poland until the Nineties 
Poland’s economic development has been marked by varying political ideologies and a 
long period of communism. Following Shapiro, the communist period can be shortly 
described as follows: “Poland's industrial history since the war falls into four relatively 
distinct periods. These are the period between the Communists' rise to power in 1944 and 
Gomułka’s return to leadership in 1956 (post-war reconstruction and industrial expansion); 
the period between 1956 and 1966 (industrial stagnation); that between 1966 and 1970 
(industrial contraction); and the Gierek years from 1970 to 1980 (brief respite followed by 
accelerated decline and crisis).” 111 
The country’s recent development since the fall of the iron curtain, however, showed a 
rapid transition from a centrally planned economy towards a free market economy.  
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4.1.1 Economic Development in the Second Polish Republic (1918-
1939) 
The Second Polish Republic emerged after 123 years of Poland’s absence on maps. The 
country had been dominated by three different powers, and “had developed along distinct 
economic and political paths.”112 Major difficulties were caused by three different 
currencies, different economic systems and little infrastructural links between the three 
(previously occupied) parts of the country. Additionally, the western parts of the country 
were far better developed than the eastern half of Poland. World War I and the Polish 
Soviet War113 had left behind chaos and destruction.  
Bearing all these difficulties in mind, Poland’s development was quite considerable: In 
1924, the economic minister Władysław Grabski founded the Bank of Poland and 
introduced the złoty as the new and only currency, stopping hyperinflation and creating a 
stable currency.  
On the basis of economic development plans, two infrastructural projects were focussed 
upon during this period: The first was the construction of the Gdynia seaport, allowing 
Poland to bypass Gdask, which was under heavy German pressure to boycott Poland’s 
trade: “Germany waged a tariff war against Polish coal and steel as part of the attempt to 
destroy the new state.”114 The second focus was on the establishment of a central industrial 
district. The industrialization plans were enabled by French government loans. 
Hydroelectric dams, steel production, rubber and chemical industries were established. 
However, these positive developments were abruptly stopped with the outbreak of the 
Second World War in 1939. 
4.1.2 Economic Development under Communist Rule (1945-1989)115  
As the Soviet Union had contributed considerably to defeat Germany, the allies were in no 
position to exert pressure on Stalin concerning the case of Poland. When the relationships 
between the Soviet Union and the Western allies worsened between 1945 and 1948, 
Europe was split into two opposing ideologies and Poland was left on the eastern side of 
the Iron Curtain. This included the exposure to Union of Soviet Socialist Republics’ 
(USSR) dominance as well as a centrally planned economy. These plans (short term plans, 
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annual plans and medium-term plans) covered all aspects of economic activity, and were 
prepared by the national planning office.116 In Poland this transformation to a planned 
economy was initiated with a six-year plan, introduced in 1950.  
The dependence on the USSR also meant alienation from Western industrial capitalist 
countries, and trade with them was limited to a minimum. The Soviet Union focussed 
mainly on heavy industry, particularly on sectors like coal, steel and machine production, 
and transferred this focus to its satellite states, too. Light industries and consumer goods 
industry were rather disregarded.  
Shapiro’s examples illustrate the dependence created by the Soviet Union: It went “from 
the building of factories requiring the import of Soviet raw materials, to excessively cheap 
military production to meet Soviet needs, particularly during the Korean war, to Soviet 
“purchase” of Polish coal reserves, in one case at 10% of world market prices.”117 
Such actions, together with the creation of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(COMECON), helped consolidate Soviet dominance in the Eastern bloc. COMECON was 
the USSR’s answer to the US Marshall Plan118, which had only been introduced in 1947. 
This plan, formally called European Recovery Program (ERP), provided economic 
assistance from the US to Western European countries. The assistance was offered to the 
Eastern bloc as well, but the money was tied to requirements such as convertible currencies 
and market economies. When some countries, such as Poland and Hungary, showed 
interest in the Marshall Plan anyway, the Soviet Union countered with the introduction of 
COMECON. All satellite states of the USSR became members of this organization. In the 
long run, the organization’s goal was to coordinate the national economic plans, as well as 
to cooperate and specialize within the international division of labor between the 
participating countries.119 
During the first decade of Communist rule, Poland grew considerably, keeping in mind 
that the country had been devastated by the Second World War. Above all, the industrial 
sector grew very fast: Had the coal production fallen from about 70 000 tons in 1938 to 
about 27 000 tons in 1945, it rose to about 95 000 tons by 1955. Crude steel, coke, iron ore, 
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cement and electric power production experienced similar positive developments. National 
income grew at an annual rate of 8,6% between 1951 and 1955.120 
Until the 1960s, Poland was a stable economy. The relative well-being of the people was 
crucial for the acceptance of the communist regime. One advantage of communism was an 
unemployment rate of zero, and the expanding industries of steel and coal production as 
well as the chemical industry facilitated this policy. Yet, this turned into a problem, when 
rising labor participation ratios, combined with declining growth rates and stagnation in 
income growth emerged in the early 1960s. 
By 1968, the economy stagnated, and although this was not expressed in an increase in 
unemployment rates (as this might be the case in a market economy), it became manifest in 
consumer good shortages. Products such as meat became scarce. Like other parts of 
Europe, Poland was swamped by student protests, too. Obviously, the official response was 
“heavy-handed”121. It was not only food that was scarce due to bad planning. One of the 
biggest problems apart from basic food was housing, as “housing programmes lagged 
behind growing demand”122. When food shortages became worse by the end of the 1960s, 
government raised the prices for basic foods, in order to balance supply and demand. This 
move led to riots in coastal towns such as Gdynia. Again, the official response was brutal 
and some workers were shot.  
After these events, the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party, Władysław 
Gomułka, who had been in office from the 1956 riots on (they had also started due to food 
shortages), resigned, and cleared the way for Edward Gierek. The new government under 
Gierek had to stop price increases and instead decided on a two year price freeze, which 
then had to be extended until 1975.  
Edward Gierek was communist party first secretary from 1970 to 1980. Gierek relied 
heavily on establishing relations with the West in contrast to his predecessors: “From the 
moment that the Gierek team came to power (December 1970), one of its key foreign 
policy concerns was Poland's relations with the West. According to the Gierekovite design, 
Poland was supposed to become a buffer society par excellence between East and 
West.”123 By creating ties to Western countries and particularly to Germany’s and France’s 
governments, Western capital could be attracted to large extent. Under this policy, FDI 
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rose considerably and Poland experienced big economic growth. The idea was to build up 
modern industries, where cheap socialist workers would produce goods that could compete 
in Western countries. This policy showed quite some success at the beginning: Real wages 
increased by 100% between 1970 and 1975, and the production of domestic consumer 
goods augmented considerably.124 
This boom was not to last for a long time, partly due to the lack in managerial knowledge 
in Polish companies. The huge amount of fresh capital could not be used effectively, as 
Poland did not provide the know-how to establish an industry that could compete with 
Western standards. As the strategy failed, Western countries were not willing any more to 
give credits, and Poland remained with a huge external debt. “Debt service expanded from 
27% of merchandise exports in 1974 to 43% in 1975 to 70% in 1980. After 1976, debt-
servicing needs forced leadership to turn to short term high interest loans to remain 
solvent.[…] By late 1979 Poland was desperately negotiating a USD 500 million loan to 
deal with short-term debt-service commitments as the debt-service ratios soared, reaching 
levels comparable only with countries like Mexico and Brazil.”125 
As experienced before in Poland’s existence under communism, the population was 
affected heavily by the economic crises: The shops were empty and food prices rose 
quickly. Besides strikes another consequence that resulted from the shortages and price 
increases was a boom of the black market.  
According to Sanford, 1976 and onwards was the time, when “Soviet bloc failure of the 
command economy in terms of growth performance, efficiency and consumer satisfaction 
was most striking.”126 Characteristics of this failure were the above mentioned consumer 
shortages and the black market, but also growing inflation and hard currency debts.  
By the end of the 1970s two big events shaped the general development of Poland: In 
1978, a Polish Cardinal was elected Pope: Karol Józef Wojtyła. This was seen as a signal 
for the international recognition of Poland’s suffering under de facto foreign rule and 
communism.  
Secondly, a worker’s strike that had broken out at Gdansk shipyard in 1980 led to the 
emergence of the Solidarno movement. The immediate trigger for the outbreak of the 
strike was the price increase of meat. The underlying reasons for the crisis were, obviously, 
much more complex: As Shapiro puts it, “the convergence of Poland's long-term structural 
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problems of investment shortage, weak trading position, and chronically unproductive 
agriculture”127 caused the 1980 events. That year, Poland required about 11 billion USD 
for debt service and the country’s hard currency reserves were more and more depleted, as 
the money was needed for subsidized consumption imports. Since 1975, productivity had 
grown much slower than wages. “This combination was bound to result in incompatible 
demands being placed on economic planners.”128 
As the following graph illustrates, GDP, too, developed very negatively. It has experienced 
extreme negative growth twice since 1980: During and after the 1980 crisis, when it 
reached a negative record of -10%, and one decade later, by 1990, when Poland went 
through an economic crisis described in Chapter 4.1.3. In 1990, GDP growth reached a 
negative value of -7,2%. 
Poland Gross domestic product, constant prices
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Figure 6: Poland's GDP annual growth rate from 1980 until 2003129 
 
Appendix III illustrates the GDP development under Communism from 1950 until the mid 
1980s. 
The Solidarno movement had severe and long lasting consequences for Poland compared 
to previous working class – state confrontations (like the crises in 1956, 1970-71 and 
1976), which seem to have a historical tradition. Aspects that differ to prior crises “concern 
the historically unparalleled staying power and organizational self-discipline of the striking 
workers; the different social groupings, with the intellectuals allying themselves to the 
workers and the Catholic church equivocating and finally coming out against the 
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continuation of the strikes and for the forces of “order”; and the response of the Party to 
the crisis, which was more subtle and sophisticated than in previous years.”130 
The most visible response of the government was to displace Gierek. The next strong 
political leader in office was Wojciech Witold Jaruzelski, who was Prime Minister from 
1981 to 1985.131 By the fall of 1981, “when the momentum of the Solidarity movement 
coupled with the development of a grass-roots movement within the local party apparatus 
threatened to sweep the increasingly more isolated communist elite from power”132, and 
when the Soviet Union heavily threatened to intervene in Poland via the Warsaw Pact, 
Jaruzelski imposed martial law in Poland. This step rendered Solidarity an illegal 
organization, and thousands of its members and activists were arrested and put into 
specially built camps. “Initially all forms of social associations were banned, all enterprises 
came under the control, or at least the scrutiny, of military commissioners, and a curfew 
was imposed.”133 In response to these developments, the West was quick to react and 
imposed a number of economic sanctions against Poland. These sanctions mainly 
comprised the halt of substantial capital movements to Poland and the denial of many trade 
opportunities. The Jaruzelski regime defended its actions arguing that it had been forced to 
take on extreme measures in order to protect Poland from disaster. Jaruzelski affirmed his 
commitment to reforms and liberalization.134 
Martial law did not last for a very long time: By April 1982, the government had started to 
dialogue with the opposition, in November Lech Wałsa was released from internment (in 
1983 he was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace) and in July 1982, martial law was 
terminated. In 1986 all remaining detainees (arrested under martial law) were amnestied. 
One of the main goals of Jaruzelski, the weakening of Solidarity, had not been achieved 
with the imposition of martial law. At best, it had delayed its advance by several years.135 
Following Gentleman and Zubek, four factors contributed to the demise of the Polish 
Communist system in the second half of the 1980s: First of all, as already mentioned 
above, Poland’s economy was paralyzed by foreign debt and was still stuck in structural 
crisis. After years of stagnation, deep recession followed and throughout the whole of the 
1980s, the standard of living of the population worsened. Second, the solidarity movement 
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was growing rapidly, it enjoyed great reputation in wide parts of society. Thirdly, new 
intellectual life within the Communist party emerged. However, it did not remain within 
the party, but spread to the opposition as well. Apart from these domestic developments, 
the USSR experienced great changes from 1985 on, when Mikhail Gorbachev became 
General Secretary of the Communist Party. He started his reform programmes by 1986, 
and glasnost (liberalization) and perestroika (reconstruction) not only had consequences 
for the Soviet Union but also for its satellite states. At the same time, the satellite states 
were allowed more freedom, and the economic and military threat was diminished. 
As opposition and criticism had grown strikingly, and as the government had to cope with 
foreign debts amounting to 45 billion USD in 1988, it had to seek social approval for 
difficult economic reforms. Hence the government had to open negotiations with the 
opposition. “Although the Polish communist leadership was still reluctant to draw 
solidarity into discussions, it had no choice. Between 6 February and 4 June 1989 the 
newly legalised Solidarity trade union, led by Wałsa, in the course of long debates 
hammered out conditions under which they would support the government’s reforms.”136 
The negotiations, called Round Table Talks, led to astonishing results: Free trade unions 
were legalised, but what was even more important, rules were set up for the process of 
transformation to a fully democratic political system. All these decisions were fully backed 
by Gorbachev. The agreements specified that political democratization would start with 
parliamentary elections in June 1989, and would conclude with fully democratic elections 
held no later than 1993, “that would firmly establish the country’s democratic 
credentials.”137 At the same time economic reforms and liberalization should take place. In 
1990, Lech Wałsa became the first freely elected President of the Republic of Poland. 
János Kornai wrote in a comment in 1990: “Immediately following the revolutions all East 
European countries knew a period of euphoria and new hopes associated with the idea of 
free elections. However, that will all be behind us after a while, and then comes the more 
difficult phase of actual policymaking.”138 This phase was to be called the transition 
period. 
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4.1.3 Polish Society between Communism and Transition 
To get an impression on how Polish society thought about this eventful time, it is very 
useful and interesting to read through Laborem Exercens, written by the most prominent 
Pole of that time, Pope John Paul II, who published the encyclical shortly after the 
Solidarno movement reached its peak, in September 1981. Although the Pope does not 
explicitly write about Poland, he stresses “a need for ever new movements of solidarity of 
the workers and with the workers. This solidarity must be present whenever it is called for 
by the social degrading of the subject of work, by exploitation of the workers, and by the 
growing areas of poverty and even hunger. The Church is firmly committed to this cause 
[…].”139 The Pope’s support for the Solidarity movement does not mean he condemns 
Marxism: Various parts of Laborem exercens seem to be quite compatible with 
communism, as the passage on work and ownership illustrates: “the right to private 
property is subordinated to the right to common use, to the fact that goods are meant for 
everyone.”140 Chapter 16 sounds quite socialistic, too, when the Pope writes: “Work is, as 
has been said, an obligation, that is to say, a duty, on the part of man.”141 Concerning 
unemployment, he states: “In order to meet the danger of unemployment and to ensure 
employment for all, the agents defined here as “indirect employer” must make provision 
for overall planning with regard to the different kinds of work […]. In the final analysis 
this overall concern weighs on the shoulders of the State […].”142 This chapter further 
points out the important role of International Organizations in reducing “the disturbing 
differences”143 in living standard among different countries. 
A passage that has gained even more importance nowadays that unemployment in Poland 
is soaring can be found in Chapter 9, where John Paul II declares: “Work is a good thing 
for man – a good thing for his humanity – because through work man not only transforms 
nature, adapting it to his own needs, but he also achieves fulfilment as a human being and 
indeed, in a sense, becomes ‘more a human being’.”144 
To conclude, John Paul II, and with him many Poles, did not postulate the end of 
socialism, but rather called for condign working conditions and better living standards for 
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the Polish people. The fast transition towards a market economy came as a shock for many 
and until today many Poles rather think in socialist than in liberal terms.  
4.1.4 Economic Development in the Transition Period  
Despite the agreement on the necessity of introducing a pluralist democracy and a market-
driven economy, fears came up concerning the external debt the country still had to deal 
with by the beginning of the nineties. Some daunting examples of indebted developing 
nations created worries that Poland would be left with no room for economic maneuver, 
and that the national economy “would languish, stagnant, on the fringes of the capitalist 
economies,”145 as Gentleman and Zubek put it. Thus it became clear very quickly that the 
best guarantee for rapid economic growth and wealth lay in joining Western Europe, which 
was at the very same moment in the middle of reaching deeper economic integration (the 
Maastricht treaty was signed in 1992). Lipton and Sachs argue in a similar way, saying that 
in 1989 leaders of Eastern Europe described their aim as a “return to Europe”.146 This view 
was underpinned by calling the region rather East Central Europe than Eastern Europe, 
“stressing their countries’ place in the mainstream of European history, politics, arts, and 
economy.”147 
One problem Poland had to deal with quickly when transition started was hyperinflation. 
The reasons for this hyperinflation were diverse: On the one hand, households were given 
legal access to foreign exchange in the parallel market in 1989, which led to a currency 
flight. On the other hand, formal wage indexation was introduced as one result of the 
Round Table Talks. This resulted in huge real wage increases in some sectors. And finally, 
the level of food subsidies was reduced and most retail food prices were freed from 
controls, which led to an explosion in food prices.  
The measures concerning transition to a market economy taken by the government, also 
known as “shock therapy”, were extensive and very ambitious. The initiatives included: 
“privatization, to begin transforming the ownership structure of national assets; a 
competition program, to break up and prevent monopolies, remove restrictions to the entry 
of new enterprises, and introduce bankruptcy procedures suited to a corporate setting; 
banking system modernization, to increase the number and variety of financial institutions 
and improve the regulatory, accounting, and prudential environment; and tax reform, to 
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reduce the present reliance on the distortionary turnover tax and introduce a broad-based 
value-added tax and a personal income tax.”148 Concrete measures included the 
introduction of a uniform tariff of 20%, a depreciation of the złoty, and the establishment 
of currency convertibility and a fixed exchange rate for current account transactions. Prices 
of most goods were liberalized (except for goods being under price control in Western 
economies, too, such as public transportation fares, etc.), which enhanced the soaring 
inflation further.  
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Figure 7: Inflation in Poland from 1980 until 2006149 
 
As the chart above shows, Poland’s inflation (as expressed in annual percentage change) 
showed extreme peaks in various years of the 1980s, but the absolute maximum was 
reached in 1990, when inflation reached 585,5%. 
The ambitious reform program that had to be pushed trough was financially supported by 
important Western institutions. Balance of payments support was provided by: The IMF, 
which contributed a 700 billion USD standby arrangement, the Bank for International 
Settlements, which provided a 215 million USD bridge loan to the first drawing of the 
standby, and a stabilization fund created by industrial country governments, which 
contributed 1 billion USD. These supports allowed the Polish government to consider the 
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introduction of a convertible and stable exchange rate.150 Furthermore the Paris club, an 
important creditor of Poland, agreed to reschedule the repayment of debts.  
Obviously, the high inflation rate was a huge burden for the population, as was the soaring 
unemployment rate. As Lipton and Sachs predicted in their 1990 paper, the unemployment 
rate grew steadily until 2002, where it reached a peak of 19,9% (in absolute numbers: over 
3,3 million unemployed people).151 Real figures were even worse than their prediction; 
they estimated the peak would be reached at 10% as a result of the adjustment process.152 
Other problems emerged from the world industrial recession of the 1990s which heavily 
affected the formerly protected industries of Poland, particularly steel, coalmining and 
shipbuilding. This contributed to increased unemployment, too and insecurity among Poles 
augmented.153  
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Figure 8: Unemployment rate in Poland from 1995 until 2006154 
 
4.1.5 Poland’s way into the European Union 
From the beginning of transition, the EU was a “relevant external actor”, as Barbara 
Lippert puts it, “that tries to influence the path of transformation by setting strategic 
objectives (free trade area, membership), conditions (provisions in Association /Europe 
agreements, membership criteria) and by giving political and financial assistance and 
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incentives (PHARE; privileged cooperation and consultation e.g. through structured 
dialogue).” 155  
Hence, Poland already signed an economic agreement with the EC by September 1989. It 
was not only logical from Poland’s point of view to seek the proximity to the EC for 
various reasons that will be discussed in Chapter 4.3. Also from the EC’s viewpoint, it was 
not only reasonable to see new trade opportunities in the Eastern transition countries, but 
also to participate actively in their process of democratization and economic transition. The 
EC had already gained some experience “in influencing transition from dictatorship to 
democracy […] since Spain, Portugal and Greece have joined in 1986 and 1981, 
respectively.”156 However, concerning the new transition economies of Poland and the 
other former Eastern bloc countries, the EC took far more responsibility than it had done in 
the 1970s and 1980s. Having more influence on Poland than other external actors such as 
NATO or OECD157, the EU offered “carrots” to Poland, such as granting of credits and 
assistance, in exchange for democratic compliance. 
One of the first steps the EC undertook was to introduce an assistance programme for 
Poland and Hungary, called “Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their 
Economies” (PHARE), which was later extended to all Central and Eastern European 
Countries (CEEC). This programme offered know-how concerning economic 
transformation. Later, a “democracy programme” was included as well, which lent its 
support to new intermediary players and to Non Governmental Organizations (NGO).  
In May 1990 Poland applied for an association status in the EU. One year later, in 
December 1991, the Europe Agreement was signed as a result of the negotiations between 
Poland and the EC, including already a perspective of EU membership.158 This agreement 
was somewhat asymmetric, as it granted full access to the EC for many goods, while 
Poland had a longer period available to grant full reciprocity.159 
In June 1993, at a meeting of the European Council in Copenhagen, the principle of 
Eastern Enlargement was decided upon.160 The EU declared that “the associated countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union 
[…]” and that “the future cooperation […] shall be geared to the objective of membership 
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which has now been established.”161 The criteria for membership were also formulated on 
this occasion. They included stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, rule of law, a 
functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure, besides 
other conditions. Furthermore, the obligations of the membership included compliance 
with the aims of the political, economic and monetary union. 162 
In comparison to the other candidate countries, Poland had the advantage of the pioneer 
role concerning its democratization. Since the opposition had already been incorporated 
into politics by 1989, the EU considered Poland to be already in the stage of 
“consolidation” by the end of the 1990s, meaning that the country already possessed the 
characteristics of a democracy.163  
In April 1994 Poland formally applied for EU membership. That same year it participated 
in the meeting of the European Council for the first time. In 1997 the European 
Commission published the Agenda 2000, where it proposed to officially start negotiations 
of membership with Poland. One year later, in March 1998, membership negotiations took 
off. By October 2002 the European Commission published a recommendation, stating that 
by the end of 2002, the negotiations with the 10 candidates should be finished, and that the 
candidates would be ready for membership by the beginning of 2004. In 2003, the entry of 
all ten candidates was accepted by the European Parliament, and the accession treaties 
were signed. In a public opinion poll of 2003, 77% of the Polish electorate was in favour of 
Poland’s entry into the EU. The participation in the poll reached 56,58%. On May 1, 2004 
Poland, together with nine other countries, become a member state of the EU. 
Concerning the way to a market economy, Poland went through several stages, too. In a 
first step, prices, trade and currency were liberalized. Concerning monetary policy, Poland 
oriented its reforms towards the European Monetary System straight away. Furthermore 
the National Bank obtained independence; it was assigned to carry out Poland’s monetary 
system and became at the same time a supervisor of the banking system.  Its main goal 
since the beginning of the transformation process was to strengthen the złoty.  
Another important step already mentioned was the transfer in ownership. By 1998, the 
private sector already accounted for 64% of total labor force and for 60% of GDP.164 In the 
same year, a Free Trade Area was established between the EU and Poland. However, 
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already from 1995 on, 81% of all Polish exports entered the common market duty free. 
What remained subject to tariffs for a longer period was the agrarian sector. This was an 
important reason for Poland to seek full membership quickly, as the agrofood industry 
represented 20% of Poland’s entire industry.  
The country’s trade with the EU rose constantly since the signing of the Europe 
Agreement: By 1995, trade with the EU accounted already for 70% of Poland’s foreign 
trade as concerns exports and for 65% in imports. Foreign direct investment, which was 
definitely something Poland hoped to attract through its liberalization, also rose 
considerably during the nineties. According to the Polish Agency for Foreign Investment 
(PAIZ), the level of FDI accounted for over 12 billion USD in December 1996.165 The 
biggest investors during transition were US and international companies. However, 
German, Italian, Dutch and French companies also contributed considerably to the high 
FDI values. Poland’s biggest trading partners in 1996 were Germany, Italy and the 
Netherlands.166 
4.2 Reasons for joining the EU 
Poland was in a very special situation by the end of the 1980s, together with all other 
Central and Eastern European Countries. The Soviet Union collapsed and faster than 
everybody had hoped for, Poland was free to choose its own way concerning politics and 
the economy. As the dominance of the USSR had always been seen as a permanent menace 
to the sovereignty of Poland, it seems logical that the country turned to the West, hoping to 
reintegrate itself into Europe.  
For Poland not only the EU membership was crucial, NATO membership had a huge 
importance in its strategic orientation as well: NATO membership was a guarantee of 
security, as Poland sees itself as being geopolitically exposed between Russia and 
Germany, two historical threats.167 Hence, the US (and thus the NATO) was seen as the 
only possible protecting power.  
EU membership was seen as a security advantage as well, but in this case the economic 
aspects were far more important. Poland sought above all “long-term prospects for 
economic growth”, it hoped for a fast transfer of Western know-how to Poland, concerning 
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all aspects of the economy, and big amounts of FDI inflow, as it had to struggle with a 
huge external debt in 1990.  
As could be seen in the negotiations for membership, Poland had big doubts about the EU 
as well, particularly concerning agriculture: With its entry, Poland would become the EU 
member with the biggest agrarian sector (2 million out of 22 million EU farmers are 
Polish168). Thus, it reclaimed big amounts of agricultural subsidies, as its agriculture would 
be exposed to competition immediately.  
On the other hand the liberalization of Poland’s economy, including the agrarian sector, 
opened a market of 400 million inhabitants to the country, offering thus huge potential for 
growth. 
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5 Comparison Poland - Mexico169 
The cases of Mexico and Poland during the second part of the last century are very 
interesting to compare, as these two countries show some very similar developments in the 
past, but simultaneously some contrasting ones.170  
Something both countries have in common is the style of political governance throughout 
big parts of the twentieth century: Mexico and Poland were both ruled under authoritarian 
regimes during long periods of time. Both leaderships were taken over in the name of 
Marxism, although the following politics took very different directions. The leading power 
in Poland was a Communist hegemonic party which enjoyed sovereignty within the Soviet 
bloc. In Mexico the ruling party was the Partido Revolucionario Institucional that 
“jealously guarded the national sovereignty and promoted a state-led mixed economy and a 
corporatist order.”171 Interestingly, both clearly undemocratic regimes wanted to preserve 
the image of functioning democratic processes as much as possible. This resulted in many 
quasidemocratic institutions and regular elections. In Poland, strict pre-arranged methods 
assured regular victories of the Communist party, whereas in Mexico electoral fraud made 
sure the PRI would always win elections.  
Another point in common of both countries was their fast industrialization in the 1970s. 
Initially both ruling parties emphasized trade promotion and were rather reserved towards 
borrowing of foreign capital and technology. However, as these strategies did not quite 
work out, both countries switched to massive foreign borrowing from Western industrial 
nations in order to reach rapid industrialization. The governments calculated that the 
impetus of foreign capital would create so much improvement in productivity that they 
would be able to meet their external obligations easily (This was particularly the belief in 
Mexico in the times of their oil El Dorado).  
As already discussed in previous chapters, these beliefs proved to be wrong and Poland 
and Mexico were left with tremendous amounts of external debts, paralyzing the national 
economies and lowering the standard of living of the population seriously. In both 
countries this situation led to big social and political unrest, and the opposition was clearly 
strengthened: “In Poland, this led to the unprecedented emergence of Solidarity, and in 
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Mexico it served to re-energize the Center-Right PAN on the one hand and to serve as a 
catalyst for the new Cardenas movement on the other.”172 
What was very different in the developments of Poland and Mexico was the way they 
organized for reform and economic transition: In the case of Poland it was clear from the 
beginning on that economic development and integration would go hand in hand with 
democratization. This was not only clear since Gorbachev had proclaimed perestroika and 
glasnost, but also due to the fact that the European Community required all countries 
interested in membership to provide functioning democracies (this requirement was 
already written down in the Treaty of Rome173). Anyway, following Wojna, “Polish elites 
were clearly committed to democracy and were determined to shape Poland's political 
future to accommodate West European expectations of political development in an entirely 
clear and unambiguous way.”174 
In Mexico on the other hand it was very important to President Salinas that the US would 
not insist on any democratic conditions in the negotiations for NAFTA. In press statements 
by the end of 1990, he clearly stated “that any further political liberalization would have to 
wait till after economic goals had been reached.”175 His argument was that the 
improvement of the population’s well-being could be primarily met with economic reform, 
and that well-being was the government’s priority. According to Armendares, the US 
backed the position that political reform should be preceded by economic reform.176 Thus, 
Mexico clearly understood that in contrast to Poland’s integration to the European 
Community, democratization was no prerequisite for Mexico’s participation in the North 
American Free Trade Agreement. 
This fundamental difference already gives a hint at the differing conceptions of the EU and 
the NAFTA and shows that the concept of the EU is far more comprehensive than NAFTA 
ever intended. On the other hand, the US do not only possess the instrument of NAFTA to 
influence and shape developments within Mexico.  
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Part III 
6 The Countries’ recent Developments  
In this part, conclusions from historical developments in Mexico and Poland will be drawn 
and insights into recent developments in these economies will be provided. First, the 
indicators described in Chapter 1.2 will be analysed in depth and possible relationships 
between them will be identified. Then, the general economic and political environment will 
be discussed and positive and negative effects of NAFTA and EU membership examined. 
To sum up, the main differences between Mexico as part of NAFTA and Poland as part of 
EU will be outlined and possible future implications presented. 
6.1 Mexico’s recent development in numbers 
Demographic developments as well as general economic and national finance data, data on 
the Mexican labor market and indicators for infrastructure, human development and 
corruption will be described in detail in the following sections. 
6.1.1 Demographic Data 
Concerning total population and the population growth rate, data reaching back to 1980 
can be found at the IMF’s statistical database.177 Mexico’s population is continuously 
growing, although the pace of growth has been slowing in recent years. While Mexico had 
a population of 67,57 million in 1980 and an annual population growth rate of 2,40%, the 
growth slowed to 1% per year and the country reached a population figure of 104,14 
million by 2006. Estimates for next year show population figures of 106,27 million by the 
year 2008. These IMF figures correspond largely with the figures published by the Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (INEGI) of Mexico178, however other 
sources such as the CIA factbook estimate Mexico to have a population of 108,7 million in 
2007179. Appendix V illustrates the development of Mexico’s population and its growth 
rate over the last decades. 
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Mexico ranks 11th among the world’s most populous countries and is the largest Spanish 
speaking country in the world. 
The CIA factbook information on Mexico also includes 2007 estimates for birth rate and 
death rate. 20,36 births per 1000 inhabitants and 4,76 deaths per 1000 inhabitants confirm 
the data on a positive population growth rate. 
Other indicators, such as the infant mortality rate and life expectancy rate give a little 
insight into a country’s health care system. The higher the infant mortality and the lower 
the life expectancy, the worse are the medical standards of the country. In Mexico the 
relation of deaths to live births is 19,63 to 1000 (2007 estimate), which is average in global 
comparison.180 Following OECD statistics the infant mortality rate has developed 
positively, declining from 23,3 deaths per 1000 live births in the year 2000 to 19,7 : 1000 
in 2004.181 Concerning the life expectancy rate at birth, Mexico developed positively as 
well: OECD statistics show an increase from 74,1 years in the year 2000 to 75,2 years by 
the year 2004. The CIA factbook estimate for 2007 reaches 75,63 years.  
The following indicators, literacy rate and population living below poverty line, permit 
some conclusions concerning the education system and welfare in a given country. 
Mexico’s literacy rate is relatively high; the 2007 estimate of the CIA factbook reaches 
91%. However, literacy is not equally distributed between men and women. An education 
brief provided by UNESCO shows a literacy rate of over 93% for men and only 91% for 
women. A positive trend is the high literacy rate among young people: Within the age 
group between 15 to 24 years, 97,6% are literate (both men and women).182  
Poverty is a big problem in Mexico: In 2000, 24,2% of Mexico’s population lived below 
the national poverty line. According to the World Bank poverty indicators, this level could 
be reduced to 17,2% in 2005. What is even worse: 3% of Mexico’s population has only 1 
USD or less available per day.183 
6.1.2 Economic Data 
Mexico’s GDP has been growing considerably over the last two decades. The GDP curve 
depicted in Appendix VI illustrates the development from 206,6 billion USD in 1980 up to 
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840 billion USD by 2006. However, economic crises are also reflected in the GDP 
development. Slumps in the GDP curve can be observed from the beginning of the 1980ies 
until 1986, when Mexican GDP reached a bottom level of 135,4 billion USD. Another 
sharp decline followed between 1994 and 1995, when GDP fell from 420,7 billion USD to 
286,2 billion USD within one year. Since then, GDP has continuously been growing, 
despite the year 2003 when a slightly negative growth rate of – 1,52% could be observed. 
In 2006 the annual GDP grew at a rate of 9,42%. For the years 2007 and 2008 the IMF 
predicts a slower growth of 6,8%, respectively 6%.  
According to an OECD economic outlook for 2007, “private investment, in particular, was 
an important driver of growth, as solid export volume growth and reduced political 
uncertainties after the elections boosted business confidence.”184 
GDP composition by sector follows the global trend: According to the CIA factbook185, 
70,5% of the GDP are made up by services, followed by industry with 25,7% and 
agriculture with only 3,9%. However, labor force composition by sector shows another 
picture: Only 58% of Mexico’s labor force is occupied in services, 24% are employed in 
industry, and 18% work in agriculture. Hence, Mexican agriculture is highly inefficient, 
whereas industry and services are rather efficient. 
GDP Composition by Sector 
in Mexico
Agriculture
Industry
Services
Labor Force Composition by Sector 
in Mexico
Agriculture
Industry
Services
 
Figure 9: GDP and Labor Market Composition by Sector in Mexico 
 
Mexico’s gross national income, similar to GDP, has also increased since 1990, with the 
exception of 1995, when it declined from 412 billion USD to 347 billion USD. Appendix 
VII illustrates GNI levels and GNI per capita levels between 1990 and 2004. By 2004, GNI 
reached a level of 707 billion USD, while GNI per capita reached 6930 USD (with an 
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estimated population of 102 million in 2002).186 However, the World Bank Data does not 
correspond to the data provided by OECD187: According to OECD data, GNI per capita 
amounted to 9989 USD by 2004, which would imply a GNI of more than 1000 billion 
USD for that year. Although the data differ, both show a clearly positive trend.  
A rather negative trend can be observed within trade. Although Mexico has been acting on 
the maxim of export led growth since the 1980ies, the trade balance is still negative. 
Mexico has indeed achieved growth in exports of goods and small increases in exports of 
services since the year 2000; however, imports of goods and services remain larger, as 
Table 1 illustrates below (See Appendix VIII for graphical illustration). By 2005 Mexico’s 
exports equalled 230,3 billion USD, while its imports accounted for 242,6 billion USD, 
which resulted in a trade deficit of -12,32 billion USD. Apart from being negative, the 
trade balance has even worsened over the last years: In 2000, the trade deficit had been 
lower, with a value of -8,11 billion USD.188  
However, an OECD economic outlook for Mexico assesses the situation positively, stating: 
“The current account was close to balance in 2006, reflecting a spike in automobile 
exports, high oil revenue and continued high migrants’ remittances.”189  
Year 
Imports of 
Goods 
Exports of 
Goods 
Imports of 
Services 
Exports of 
Services 
Balance of 
Trade 
2000 171,0581 165,2721 16,0357 13,7123 -8,1094 
2001 165,0947 157,5298 16,2179 12,6603 -11,1225 
2002 165,7084 159,9779 16,7398 12,6916 -9,7787 
2003 170,5458 164,9123 17,1337 12,533 -10,2342 
2004 196,8094 187,9804 18,5619 13,9551 -13,4358 
2005 221,819 214,2073 20,7795 16,0663 -12,3249 
Table 1: Mexican Imports and Exports between 2000 and 2005190 
 
Concerning the country’s trading partners, Mexico’s most important import partner 
remains the US, accounting for 53,4% of all imports, followed by China and Japan, who 
make up 8% and 5,9% of all imports. To the country’s exporting companies, the US is 
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even more important: 85,7% of all Mexican exports go to the US, while the other “big” 
export partners, Canada and Spain, only receive 2% and 1,4% of all Mexican exports.191  
Looking at some investment data proves interesting as well: Gross capital formation has 
been continuously moving between 20% and 25% of GDP during the last 15 years, 
although an increase between the years 1995 and 2000 (with a peak level of 26% in 1997) 
can be observed.192 This indicates a relation with NAFTA, which came into force by 1994. 
However, it seems the effect of NAFTA did not last too long, as the 2004 level (22% of 
GDP) is even slightly below the 1990 level (23% of GDP) of gross capital formation.193 
Here again, World Bank data and OECD data do not fully correspond: OECD data 
available for the years 2000 until 2005 even state a continued decline in gross capital 
formation since the year 2000 (from 21,38% of GDP in 2000 to 19,31% in 2005).194 
Data on foreign direct investment are also provided by OECD195: After the 1995 crisis, 
FDI recovered quickly and moved from 9,7 billion USD that year to the peak value of 27,1 
billion USD by the year 2001. After 2001 FDI inflows went down to 14,1 billion USD by 
2003, only to increase again, as the OECD economic outlook 2007 states: “Foreign direct 
investment (FDI) inflows again reached a solid 19 billion USD (or 2% of GDP) in 
2006.”196 Most FDI flew in from the US, followed by the European Union, Canada and 
Japan. 
FDI outflows developed analogously: After a sharp decrease following 2001, FDI outflows 
improved again and reached 6 billion USD by 2005.197  
Exchange Rates developments show the following picture: During the last years, the 
exchange rates (rates of conversion) between the Mexican Peso and the USD remained 
relatively stable. After one year of appreciation (2001), the peso depreciated slightly 
against the USD: While in 2000 9,5 MXN bought 1 USD, by the year 2005 the exchange 
rate was 10,9 MXN to 1 USD. Concerning the year 2006, an OECD statement says: “The 
peso remained broadly stable vis-à-vis the dollar over the year, with a slight depreciation in 
                                                 
191
 CIA factbook: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mx.html#Econ, 
accessed on June 27, 2007. 
192
 The World Bank Group: Quick Query Millenium Development Goals, 2007 
193
 See Appendix IX for a graphical representation. 
194
 Data extracted on 2007/05/05 15:05 from OECD.Stat 
195
 Data from 1994 until 2000 extracted from: Hufbauer, Gary Clyde and Schott, Jeffrey J.(2005), p.31 
196
 OECD Economic Outlook 2007, Preliminary Edition 
197
 See Appendix X for a graphical representation. 
 59 
the latter part of the year reversing an earlier appreciation.”198 The following table gives 
the monthly exchange rates starting in January 2000. 
Month/Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
January 9,6253 9,6828 9,1480 10,8990 11,0700 11,1925 10,5593 11,0155 
February 9,3662 9,6900 9,1038 11,0300 11,0780 11,1010 10,5470 11,1795 
March 9,2845 9,5800 9,0000 10,7800 11,1440 11,1928 10,9000 11,0573 
April 9,4127 9,3500 9,4100 10,2700 11,4350 11,1035 11,0455 10,9615 
May 9,5110 9,2700 9,6400 10,3250 11,4370 10,9012 11,3618 10,7540 
June 9,8243 9,0710 9,9700 10,4650 11,5500 10,7600 11,1500 10,8153 
July 9,3667 9,1692 9,8700 10,6100 11,4300 10,6100 10,9853   
August 9,1995 9,1982 9,9800 10,7340 11,4050 10,8150 10,9280   
September 9,4459 9,5200 10,2150 11,1300 11,3950 10,7765 11,0061   
October 9,5680 9,2700 10,2070 11,0250 11,5400 10,8010 10,7706   
November 9,4155 9,2250 10,1550 11,3620 11,2512 10,5660 10,9840   
December 9,6098 9,2018 10,4000 11,3200 11,1595 10,6415 10,8170   
Average 9,4691 9,3523 9,7582 10,8292 11,3246 10,8718 10,9212 10,9639 
Table 2: Monthly Exchange Rates MXN-USD between 2000 and 2007199 
 
Other data available are on the nominal effective exchange rate, the relative consumer 
price index and the relative unit labor costs. The combination of the latter gives the real 
effective exchange rates. As can be observed in Appendix XI, real effective exchange rates 
were always above the nominal effective exchange rate. The appreciation of relative unit 
labor costs implies a certain loss of competitiveness vis-à-vis other currencies.200  
Mexico’s long term interest rates have been quite high compared to the US or European 
countries. However, the country’s interest rates have decreased from 16,9% in 2000 to 
7,5% by 2006.201 Since 2002, the interest rates have been stable between 7 and 8%.202  
In the long term, Mexico’s inflation has developed positively since the late nineties: From 
1999 on, inflation has continuously decreased. At the moment it is stable at approximately 
4% per annum.203 However, OECD officials state the following concerning Mexico’s 
inflation in 2006 and onwards: “Reflecting erratic movements in food prices and a series of 
supply shocks, consumer price index headline inflation turned up in the course of 2006 and 
has been hovering just over 4% (year-on-year) since September, above the Central Bank’s 
target of 3% at the top of its variability interval of plus or minus 1 percentage point. Core 
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inflation has also been increasing, reaching close to 4% in March. Even so, inflation 
expectations for the end of 2008 remain broadly unchanged at 3,5%, and contractual wage 
increases are still moderate at around 4,3%.”204 Appendix XIII gives an overview of the 
country’s inflation rate over the last two decades. 
A particularly interesting indicator for a country like Mexico is the amount of remittances 
from nationals living abroad. According to the world development indicators database of 
the World Bank205, remittances have augmented from 7,5 billion USD in 2000 to 21,8 
billion USD in 2005. This value exceeds all FDI inflows to Mexico (18 billion USD) the 
same year. At the same time the increasing amount of remittances indicates that 
immigration from Mexicans to the US is ever increasing, a development the US had hoped 
to halt with NAFTA. 
6.1.3 National Finance Data 
In 2006, Mexico’s budget was balanced, reaching revenues of 196,5 billion USD versus 
196,2 billion USD in expenditures.206 For this year OECD officials state: “The 2007 
budget targets a balanced budget […]. Given the budget assumption of a slowdown in 
activity and lower oil related revenue, this target implies a tightening of the fiscal 
stance.”207 A tightening of the fiscal state is a measure many international experts (across 
OECD, IMF, World Bank, etc) claim, as the country is losing huge amounts of tax 
revenues at the moment.  
The country’s total tax revenue208 is very low compared to other OECD countries, such as 
Austria but also the US.209 Since 2000 it has hardly increased: While accounting for 
18,48% of Mexico’s GDP in 2000, it only augmented to 19,28% by the year 2005.  
Taxes on goods and services210 account for the biggest share within total tax revenue: 
While decreasing from 9,8% of GDP in 2000 to 8,9% in 2002, this trend could be reversed 
and by 2005, taxes on goods and services accounted for 11,26% of GDP. 
Taxes on income and profits211 form an important part of total tax revenue, too, although 
their share of GDP has decreased over time. In 2000, taxes on income and profits 
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accounted for 5,04% of GDP, while by 2005, their share had already decreased to 4,8% of 
GDP.  
At a later point in their report, OECD officials reinforce the need for tightening of  fiscal 
stance and fiscal reform: “[…] if a fiscal reform is passed to establish a reliable revenue 
basis for the financing of development needs and if progress is made in increasing effective 
competition in product markets, then this would boost confidence and underpin higher 
GDP growth.”212 
Unlike the country’s low tax income, Mexico’s reserves of foreign exchange and gold are 
huge: In 2006, these reserves had a value of 85 billion USD.213 
Another aspect of Mexico’s finance is the country’s indebtedness. According to CIA data, 
the country’s public debt corresponded to 20,7% of GDP by 2006.214 Its total debt service 
has decreased from 30,4% (Percent of exports of goods, services and income) in 2000 to 
17,2% by 2005.215  
Mexico is an economic aid recipient. In 2005, it received 189,4 million USD in official 
development assistance and official aid. 
6.1.4 Labor Market Data 
As depicted in Figure 1, labor force by occupation in Mexico is divided into 58% working 
in services, 24% in industry and 18% in agriculture. Total employment rate has hardly 
changed between 2000 and 2005: It remained stable at approximately 60%.  
Officially, Mexico has an extremely low unemployment rate: According to INEGI and 
CIA information, it only reaches 3,2% (2006 survey data). The CIA information includes 
the side note that approximately 25% of Mexico’s labor force is underoccupied (less than 
35 hours of work per week).  
Since unemployment compensation is inexistent, the unemployed (and big parts of the 
underoccupied) are actually working in the underground economy and do not state that 
they are unemployed. Data are gathered through surveys and not through government 
agencies (as in other countries where government agencies are responsible to pay 
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unemployment compensation and give incentives to the unemployed to register). This 
provides the government with very low unemployment figures; however, these people’s 
situation is extremely precarious, since their work situation has no legal base.  
This situation leads to the paradox that children selling chewing gum in the streets or 
people selling pirated CDs on the subway count as employed.  
Furthermore it is interesting to take a look at youth unemployment, since these rates (even 
the official ones) are significantly higher than overall unemployment rates: According to 
the World Bank, unemployment among 15-24 year olds reached 6% in 2004 (it has been at 
around 6% for several years).216 
6.1.5 Infrastructure 
Some data on infrastructure217 give insight into the development of living conditions in 
Mexico: While in 1990, only 58% of Mexico’s population had access to improved 
sanitation facilities, this number augmented to 79% by 2004. 
Access to clean water has nearly reached 100%: while in 1990, only 82% had access to an 
improved water source, by 2004 97% of all Mexicans accessed clean water. 
Although these data indicate big improvements in living conditions, much remains to be 
done concerning improved sanitation facilities, as 20% of Mexico’s population still lives 
without appropriate access to the very same. 
6.1.6 Composite Indices 
Several indicators of income inequality exist. One of them, the Gini Coefficient, takes into 
account the inequality in the distribution of family income over its whole range in a 
country. According to UNDP’s Human Development Report 2006, Mexico has a Gini 
Coefficient of 0,495.218 
The Human Development Index, where Mexico ranks 53rd (out of 177 listed nations), is a 
broader index, as it comprises not only the dimension of income inequality but also other 
factors, such as life expectancy and literacy rates. During the last thirty years, Mexico’s 
HDI has been continuously rising, from 0,691 in 1975 up to 0,821 in 2004.219 
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As Mexico lies within the upper third in both indices, it ranks as to equality below all other 
OECD countries, leaving much space for improvement. 
Another composite index is the corruption perception index (CPI), published annually by 
Transparency International.220 The index ranges from 10 (highly clean) to 0 (highly 
corrupt), and is calculated on a country basis. For 2006, 163 countries have been surveyed 
by Transparency International. Mexico occupies rank number 75, with a score of 3,3. 
Other countries scoring 3,3 are China, Egypt and Ghana.221 As can been easily seen from 
Mexico’s corruption perception index, the country has a huge corruption problem. Looking 
at CPI publications from 2001 onwards, Mexico’s perceived corruption has even 
worsened: In 2001, the country had a CPI of 3,7, compared to 3,5 in 2005 and 3,3 in 2006. 
6.1.7 Regional Disparities 
Although most statistics published by international organizations compare nations with 
each other, it is also worth to take a look at regional disparities within a single country. In 
the case of Mexico it is well known that regional differences are most visible between 
Northern and Southern regions of the country. It is generally said that Mexico’s north is 
much more developed than Mexico’s south. Even in last June’s presidential elections this 
trend could be observed, when neoliberal PAN won majorities in virtually all Northern 
regions, while socialist PRD won majorities all over the South.222  
Concerning the above mentioned indicators – such as GDP per capita – disparities can also 
be found. According to an OECD report, Mexico is among the member countries with the 
“largest regional inequalities in GDP per capita.”223 As Figure 10 illustrates, GDP per 
capita is significantly lower in Mexico’s South than in its North (with the exceptions of the 
Yucatán Peninsula and Mexico City, both situated in the South). 
Regions with higher-than-average GDP per capita are kept in dark blue while regions with 
low GDP per capita levels are kept in dark red. 
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Figure 10: Regional GDP per capita in Mexico224 
Regional productivity shows a similar picture: While all Southern States (except Yucatán 
Peninsula and Mexico City) are below 75% of national productivity, all northern states 
(bordering the US) are above 120% of Mexico’s national productivity.225  
Another indicator, giving more detailed information on the population’s skills, is tertiary 
education per region. Here again, Northern regions lie clearly above the national average, 
while Southern regions lag behind and are mostly below 70% of the national average.226 
Appendix XIV shows illustrations of regional productivity and tertiary education by 
region. 
Since huge regional differences cannot be neglected in Mexico it would be interesting to 
know why the country is divided into north and south. The main reason probably lies 
within Mexico’s borders: The country only has northern and southern borders, since it is 
surrounded by the Caribbean Sea in the East and the Pacific on its Western coast. Its 
northern neighbour is the US, while in the South it borders Guatemala and Belize (see map 
in Part II for an illustration). Mexico’s north clearly profits from its vicinity to the United 
States, virtually the entire maquiladora industry has been installed in border cities. 
Furthermore big parts of Mexico’s indigenous population live in the South. Their 
communities are often badly integrated into Mexico’s infrastructure and educational 
system, circumstances which enhance poverty. Guatemala is much poorer than Mexico, 
hence no positive synergy effects can be expected from this vicinity.  
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6.2 Poland’s recent development in numbers 
In the following sections some numbers and figures about Poland will be provided. These 
include main economic indicators, national finance data, labor market data, some 
information on infrastructure and on human development. 
6.2.1 Demographic Data 
Poland’s total population experienced continuous positive growth since 1980, until 
stagnation took place in the mid-nineties. Today, growth rates are negative. While Poland 
had a population of 35,58 million by 1980, this number rose to 38,66 million by 1998. 
Since then, population growth has stagnated and even decreased. The total population of 
Poland only reached 38,097 in 2006 and is expected to further decrease. While the country 
had a peak population growth rate of 1,4% in 1983, the growth rate turned negative by 
1999, by now reaching a level of – 0,18%.227 A graphical representation of Poland’s total 
population and population growth rates between 1980 and 2006 can be found in Appendix 
XV. 
This negative trend is confirmed by birth and death rates of Poland. Both rates are 
estimated at 9,94 per 1000 inhabitants in 2007228, which means that deaths equal births in 
numbers. Additionally, many Poles emigrate to other countries, which leaves Poland with a 
negative population growth rate. 
Although Poland’s population decreases, the infant morality rate has developed positively 
over the last years. The rate could be reduced from 7,7 deaths per 1000 live births in 2001 
to 7 deaths per 1000 live births in 2004, according to OECD data. Life expectancy has 
developed positively, too. While in 2001, Poles had an average life expectancy of 74,3 
years, this number rose to 75,1 years by 2005.229 According to CIA estimates230, this 
number will continue to rise this year. 
Used as rough indicators for education and welfare, literacy rate and population living 
below poverty line will be presented next. As published by the CIA, 99,8% of Poland’s 
population of age 15 and over can read and write. Hence it can be said that illiteracy is 
inexistent in Poland. Concerning population living below poverty line, hardly any data 
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could be found. According to the Human Development Report 2006, 23,8% of Poland’s 
populations lived below the national poverty line between 1990 and 2003.231 A World 
Bank publication232 reports that by the year 2000, 2% of Poland’s population had to live 
with 1 USD or less per day.  
6.2.2 Economic Data 
Poland’s gross domestic product has developed considerably over the last decades: 
Although the country’s GDP curve experienced some ups and downs, too, its growth was 
far more consistent than Mexico’s. While Poland had a GDP of 56,62 billion USD in 1980, 
its GDP has reached 338,69 billion USD by 2006. Looking at the numbers in detail, a 
development close to stagnation during the 1980ies can be observed. Within the whole 
decade, Polish GDP only grew to 62,08 billion USD (by 1990). Nevertheless, at the 
beginning of the nineties and the beginning of Poland’s transition to democracy and a 
market economy, the country’s GDP started to grow, reaching its highest growth rate 
(34,15%) in 1995, when GDP reached a level of 139,1 billion USD. Later growth slowed 
down, but took off again with Poland’s entry into the European Union in 2004. Between 
2004 and 2006 growth rates were always beyond 10%, reaching nearly 20% in 2005, when 
GDP equalled 303,16 billion USD.233  
Poland’s GDP is expected to grow further; however, IMF officials expect growth to slow 
down during 2007 and 2008. Poland’s GDP and GDP growth rates between 1980 and 2006 
are depicted in Appendix XVI.  
Looking at the compositions of GDP and labor force by sector234 proves to be very 
interesting in Poland, too. GDP composition is slightly more diversified in Poland than in 
Mexico: 64% of GDP are made up by services, 31,2% by industry and 4,8% by agriculture. 
Looking at labor force composition by sector shows quite a similar picture to Mexico: 
Only 54,9% are actually employed in services, while 29% are employed in industry and 
16,1% in agriculture. Although Poland’s GDP composition corresponds slightly more to its 
labor force composition than Mexico’s, Poland’s highly inefficient agriculture still remains 
a big problem. Figure 11 illustrates GDP and labor force composition in Poland. 
                                                 
231
 UNDP: http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_POL.html,  
Accessed on June 24, 2007 
232
 Worldbank: http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/, accessed on June 22, 2007 
233
 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2007 
234
 CIA factbook: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pl.html#Econ,  
accessed on July 4, 2007 
 67 
GDP Composition by Sector in Poland
Agric ulture  
Indus try
Servic es  
 
Labor Force by Sector in Poland
Agric ulture  
Indus try
Servic es  
 
Figure 11: GDP and Labor Market Composition by Sector in Poland 
 
Gross national income and GNI per capita developed the same way as did GDP. While 
GNI was 73,72 billion USD in 1992, it increased strongly until 1997, when it reached 
161,38 billion USD. After a five year period of slow growth, GNI growth accelerated again 
and by 2005 it reached a level of 273,1 billion USD. GNI per capita was at 1910 USD in 
1992. By 2005 this amount had increased to 7160 USD.235 GNI and GNI per capita are 
depicted in Appendix XVII. In the case of Poland, too, World Bank data and OECD data 
do not fully correspond: According to OECD, GNI per capita reached 13432 USD236 in 
2005, which is far more than the amount published by the World Bank. However, both 
publications show positive developments. 
Although Poland’s balance of trade237 is not satisfying, it shows a much more positive 
trend than does Mexico. Both countries changed their trade politics from import 
substitution to export led growth in the eighties. Both countries still have negative balances 
of trade. However, Polish imports and exports have been growing very fast during the last 
years and the country’s trade deficit could be reduced from -13,39 billion USD in 2001 to -
10,25 billion USD in 2005. While imports of goods accounted for 101,54 billion USD in 
2005, exports of goods accounted for 89,37 billion USD. Although it accounts for a much 
smaller part in trade, services regularly reach a surplus: While imports of services 
accounted for 14,31 billion USD in 2005, exports of services accounted for 16,23 billion 
USD. This makes Poland a net exporter of services. Concerning the import and export 
situation in 2006, Austria’s Central Bank stated: “Although real import growth accelerated 
more than real export growth in response to the upswing in total demand, the contribution 
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of net exports to GDP growth in the first half of 2006 remained positive.”238 The following 
table as well as Appendix XVIII illustrate developments in trade in detail. 
Year 
Imports of 
Goods 
Exports of 
Goods 
Imports of 
Services 
Exports of 
Services 
Balance of 
Trade 
2001 50,2454 36,0538 8,951 9,755 -13,3876 
2002 55,0855 40,9693 9,186 10,035 -13,2672 
2003 67,9757 53,5393 10,647 11,166 -13,9174 
2004 88,1564 73,7812 12,481 13,483 -13,3732 
2005 101,5375 89,3739 14,314 16,228 -10,2496 
Table 3: Polish Exports and Imports between 2001 and 2005 
 
Poland’s trade partners are more diversified than Mexico’s: Its most important import 
partners are Germany (29,6%), Russia (6,6%), Italy (6,6%), the Netherlands (5,9%) and 
France (5,7%). The country’s biggest export partners are Germany (28,2%), France 
(6,2%), Italy (6,1%), United Kingdom (5,6%), Czech Republic (4,6%), Russia (4,4%) and 
the Netherlands (4,2%).239 This combination of trade partners provides some insight into 
how much Poland has changed its focus from Eastern to Western Europe. Apart from some 
remaining trade with Russia, its main trade partners are Western European countries.   
A look at some investment data shows quite a different picture than in Mexico, at least 
concerning gross capital formation:240 During the last 15 years, Poland has experienced big 
fluctuations of gross capital formation between 15% and 26% of GDP. While domestic 
investment grew continuously between 1992 and 2000 (from 15% up to 25%), it stagnated 
during the following years and started to decrease in 2001. By 2005 gross capital formation 
reached 19% of GDP. Again, OECD data differ from World Bank data, giving slightly 
lower values for each year.241 However, the trend remains the same. A fifteen year 
development of gross capital formation can be found in Appendix XIX.  
A look at foreign direct investment proves interesting, too: A jump in FDI inflows clearly 
marks Poland’s entry into the European Union in 2004. While FDI inflows had been at 4,9 
billion USD in 2003, they jumped to 12,4 billion USD in 2004. However, in 2005 FDI 
inflows decreased again, reaching 7,7 billion USD. FDI outflows developed likewise, but 
                                                 
238
 OENB: Focus 02/06 – Developments in Selected Countries, p.21 
239
 CIA Factbook: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pl.html#Econ, accessed 
on July 6, 2007 
240
 The World Bank Group: Quick Query Millenium Development Goals, 2007 
241
 Data extracted on 2007/05/05 15:05 from OECD.Stat 
 69 
at a much lower level: In 2002, FDI of 230 million USD flew out of Poland, by 2005 this 
value had increased to 1,5 billion USD.242  
A look at exchange rates243 between the Polish Złoty and the Euro shows that the 
relationship has been quite stable over the past years: Between 1999 and 2002, the Złoty 
appreciated against the Euro (in 2002, 3,85 Złoty bought one Euro on average). The 
appreciation was followed by a two year period of depreciation (in 2004, 4,53 PLN bought 
1 EUR on average). At the moment, the Złoty is appreciating again, this June the exchange 
rate was at 3,807 PLN / 1 EUR. Concerning last years development, Austria’s central bank 
states: “[…] the annual nominal appreciation of the zloty in euro terms continued, albeit 
declining from nearly 13% on average in 2005 to about 5% in the first half of 2006.”244 
Table 4 shows the monthly exchange rates between PLN and EUR in detail for the past 7 
seven years. 
Month/Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
January 4,105 4,160 3,859 3,592 4,070 4,713 4,079 3,820 3,880 
February 4,248 4,078 3,767 3,642 4,166 4,857 3,987 3,794 3,894 
March 4,296 3,946 3,695 3,623 4,336 4,764 4,012 3,884 3,886 
April 4,280 4,007 3,590 3,594 4,297 4,760 4,156 3,918 3,814 
May 4,181 4,073 3,484 3,713 4,334 4,721 4,175 3,895 3,782 
June 4,094 4,173 3,388 3,850 4,434 4,591 4,061 4,026 3,807 
July 4,017 4,053 3,617 4,088 4,437 4,465 4,099 3,996   
August 4,197 3,945 3,824 4,084 4,370 4,431 4,044 3,905   
September 4,291 3,917 3,847 4,070 4,464 4,375 3,916 3,965   
October 4,401 3,967 3,747 4,043 4,595 4,318 3,923 3,901   
November 4,397 3,900 3,635 3,957 4,617 4,257 3,970 3,825   
December 4,216 3,874 3,588 3,986 4,660 4,135 3,850 3,813   
Average 4,227 4,008 3,670 3,854 4,398 4,532 4,023 3,895 3,844 
Table 4: Monthly Exchange Rates PLN-EUR between 1999 and 2007 
Additional OECD data for nominal and real effective exchange rates (consumer price 
index, relative unit labor costs) is provided in Appendix XXI.  
Compared to Mexico, Poland’s long term interest rates have been relatively low: In 2004, 
they reached 6,90%, in 2005 they decreased to 5,22%245 and in 2006 and 2007 they 
averaged about 5,4 and 5,2%.246 Hence, the trend moves towards decreasing interest rates. 
                                                 
242
 Data extracted on 2007/05/05 15:05 from OECD.Stat; See Appendix XX for a graphical illustration. 
243
 ECB reference exchange rate, Polish zloty/Euro, 2:15 pm (C.E.T.) 
244
 OENB: Focus 02/06 – Developments in Selected Countries, p.22 
245
 Eurostat Yearbook 2006-07, p. 168 
246
 ECB: http://www.ecb.int/stats/money/long/html/index.en.html, accessed on July 6, 2007 
 
 70 
Since a low level of long term interest rates is a convergence criterion within the European 
Economic Community, it is in Poland’s interest to maintain this trend. The 2006 average 
within the Euro area was 3,8%.247 Appendix XXII shows a month to month development 
of Poland’s long term interest rates during last year. 
When looking at Poland’s inflation248 over the last two decades it is remarkable that all 
major movements took place in the eighties. After the economic crisis in 1990 and a peak 
inflation rate of an incredible 600%, inflation could be continuously reduced.  By 1995 
inflation was down to 27,9%, in the year 2000 it reached 10% and since then, inflation has 
been remarkably low, with a value of 3,5% when joining the European Union in 2004 and 
a 2006 value of only 1%. For the years 2007 and 2008, small inflation increases are 
predicted by IMF officials.249 With regards to the European convergence criteria, Poland’s 
inflation rate is very satisfying. The Austrian Central Bank states the following with 
regards to Poland’s inflation rate: “The decline in nominal unit labor costs in industry 
decisively contributed to very low levels of the various core inflation rates. Annual 
headline HICP250 inflation fell from about 3% in the first half of 2005 to about 1% in the 
first half of 2006, despite the rise in international energy prices. This is by far the lowest 
inflation rate in the region. Hardly any signs of demand-side inflationary pressures are 
discernible in the recent development of consumer prices. […] Drought damage, stepped-
up domestic demand and higher wage growth may lead to inflationary pressure or to higher 
imports.”251 
One last economic indicator shall be presented here: Remittances from nationals living 
abroad; this indicator is as interesting for Poland as for Mexico, since many Poles leave 
their country annually and consequently send back huge amounts of money to their 
families. According to both World Bank252 and OECD253 Poland received 3,5 billion USD 
in remittances from nationals living abroad. This number has more than doubled since 
2000, when remittances had augmented to 1,7 billion USD. However, in Poland’s case a 
comparison with FDI inflows is not as surprising as in Mexico’s case: Remittances in 2005 
were less than half the value of FDI inflows. Anyway, remittances are increasing annually, 
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which serves as a clear indicator for a continuing strong emigration flow from Poland to 
other (EU) countries.  
6.2.3 National Finance Data 
Poland’s public balance is regularly negative. After a budget deficit of 4,7% (of GDP) in 
2003, this value could be reduced to 3,9% in 2004 and to 2,5% in 2005.254 According to a 
CIA factbook estimate for 2006, revenues augmented to 62 billion USD that year, while 
expenditures accounted for 71,25 billion USD.255 Hence, the country experienced another 
year of budget deficit.  
However, Poland is by far not the only country within the European Union with regular 
budget deficits. Although all countries are required to reduce their budget deficits below 
3% of GDP according to the convergence criteria, not even all countries of the Euro zone 
fulfil this requirement: In 2005, Germany had a deficit of 3,3%, Greece had a deficit of 
4,5% and Portugal had a deficit of 6%. In this light, Poland’s public balance has developed 
very positively, lying below the required 3% in 2005. According to Austria’s central bank, 
Poland’s plans for this year’s budget deficit look as follows: “For 2007 and 2008, the 
convergence program envisages a moderate narrowing of the public deficit to 2,2% and 
1,9% of GDP, respectively (4,1% and 3,7% of GDP including pension reform costs). The 
budget draft for 2007 foresees a slightly higher public deficit of 2,4%.”256 
Within the European Union, Poland’s total tax revenue is rather low. In 2005, Poland’s 
total tax revenue reached 34,38% of GDP, according to OECD data.257 This lies between 
Austria (approximately 40%) and the United States (approximately 26%).   
In Poland, taxes on goods and services account for the biggest share in total tax revenue. 
Their share was at 11,48% in 2001 and has since increased to 12,39% by 2005.  
Taxes on income and profit also account for a big share in total tax revenue. However, this 
share is decreasing: While in 2001, they contributed 9,74% to total tax revenue, this 
number had decreased to 6,14% by 2005. 
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According to CIA data258, Poland has considerable reserves of foreign exchange and gold, 
too. It is ranked 20th, with an estimated 49,69 billion USD, before countries such as 
Norway and Germany. 
Poland’s indebtedness is also worth taking a look at: Public debt has been moving around 
40% (of GDP) during the last years (2004: 41,9%; 2005: 42,5%).259 Its total debt service 
has increased from 20,3% in 2000 to a peak of 35% in 2005.260 Last year, total debt service 
accounted for 29% of exports of goods, services and income.261 
Concerning official development assistance and official aid, few data are provided by 
World Bank: In 2000, Poland received 1,4 billion USD.262   
6.2.4 Labor Market Data 
As depicted in 5.2.2, 54,9% of Poland’s labor force works in services, 29% works in 
industry and 16,1% works in agriculture. The country’s total employment rate is 54,5%, 
which is quite low compared to other EU countries. 
Poland’s unemployment rate263, on the other hand, is the highest among all EU members. 
In 2006, 13,8% of the entire Polish labor force were unemployed. During the last decade, 
Poland’s unemployment has experienced dramatic developments: While by 1997, 
unemployment already reached 10,9%, the peak was yet to come in 2003, when 
unemployment reached 19,6%. Since then, the situation has been slightly improving. 
However, unemployment remains one of Poland’s biggest problems. 
Unemployment among young Poles is even higher: a peak was reached in 2002, when 44% 
of the total labor force aged between 15 and 24 was unemployed. In 2005, this number had 
decreased to 38%.264 Hence, the situation remains disastrous, particularly for the young. 
Austria’s central bank judges the situation ambivalently: On the one hand, Poland was able 
to slightly reduce total unemployment; on the other hand, this was partly reached through a 
decline in activity rate: “Production in the export sector boosted employment growth both 
in manufacturing and in the whole economy. The decline of the unemployment rate, which 
amounted to 4 percentage points year on year in the second quarter of 2006, was mainly 
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driven by the increase in the employment rate, which contributed 3 percentage points to 
this decline, and to a lesser extent also by a decline in the activity rate (due to a growing 
number of students and emigration).”265 
A look at Poland’s net migration rate confirms the trend towards emigration: The rate has 
been negative for some years now (2001: -0,4%, 2005: -0,3%).266 Many young Poles with 
no job perspective leave the country, heading to Western EU countries where they can live 
and work legally.  
6.2.5 Infrastructure 
In Poland “100% of the population have sustainable access to an improved water source, 
using the UNDP definition” and “100% of the population also has access to improved 
sanitation” 267, according to the European Environment and Health Committee. 
6.2.6 Composite Indices 
Composite indices such as the Human Development Index can give some insight into a 
country’s performance in comparison to other nations. According to the Human 
Development Report 2006, Poland ranks 37th with a HDI of 0,862. Poland’s HDI has 
developed positively over the last decade (in 1990, Poland’s HDI was 0,81).  
Income distribution is also more equitable in Poland than it is in Mexico. Poland’s Gini 
coefficient for 2004 was 0,345.  
Poland’s perceived corruption is only slightly lower than Mexico’s. Transparency 
International ranks Poland 62nd on its corruption perception index, where it scores 3,7 (10 
stands for highly clean and 0 for highly corrupt). It shares its rank with Jamaica.268 
According to a Transparency International Report, Poland’s corruption problem lies 
mainly within public administration, where corrupt methods seem to be common.269  
6.2.7 Regional disparities 
Poland offers quite big regional disparities, too. In the case of Poland, disparities exist 
mainly between Eastern and Western regions. According to an OECD report, regional 
GDP per capita lies above 120% of national average in most Western regions of Poland, 
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while lying below 75% in most regions that border Poland’s eastern neighbour countries. 
The region of Pomorskie (Eastern Pomerania, capital: Gdask) lies below 75%, too.270 
This region suffered particularly from its loss in significance since the end of communism. 
Shipbuilding as a main provider of employment has lost its competitiveness and what was 
once Poland’s industrial region par excellence now suffers huge economic problems. 
Regional productivity271 also varies between East and West: While most Eastern regions 
lie below 75% of national productivity, all regions bordering western countries reach at 
least 100%.  
Regional differences in GDP per capita and productivity are illustrated in Appendix XXIV. 
Unemployment rates272 vary considerably within Poland, too, although they do not provide 
such an obvious East - West pattern as do other indicators. On average (between 2001 and 
2005), the region Mazowieckie had Poland’s lowest unemployment rate with 15,44%. 
Warsaw lies in this region, and as the country’s capital it serves as an important job 
generator. Lubuskie, a western region bordering Germany, had the country’s lowest 
unemployment rate in 2005. Dolnoslaskie had the highest unemployment rates, on average 
24,6%. This region lies in the southwest and borders the Czech Republic. Appendix XXV 
gives an overview of Poland’s regional unemployment. 
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7 Insights about Mexico’s Development as a part of 
NAFTA after thirteen Years 
Mexico’s economic development since the 1980s was marked by the change from import 
substitution towards export led growth, economic liberalization and, last but not least, by 
NAFTA, which liberalized trade, too. Mexico has since then followed this path, it has 
signed many more Free Trade Agreements with other countries and very soon, the last 
tariffs will phase out within NAFTA.  
Although NAFTA has been in place for 17 years by now, assessing its impacts on Mexico 
is not an easy task, as many other factors influenced Mexico’s development, too. This 
includes economic shocks that fell into the period of NAFTA’s existence: “Because 
Mexico has experienced several major economic shocks since the early 1990s, including 
the Tequila crisis in the mid 1990s and the contagion effects of the financial crisis in Asia, 
Russia and South America in the late 1990s, it is difficult to isolate the impact of NAFTA 
on the Mexican economy.”273 Hence it is hard to say whether Mexico would have 
experienced similar economic developments without NAFTA. 
By recalling the initial aspirations of Mexico when signing the NAFTA treaty, the 
following section aims at drawing some general conclusions and tries to give an 
assessment of Mexico’s performance within NAFTA.  
7.1 Benefits 
One of Mexico’s pronounced goals by signing the NAFTA treaty was to increase welfare 
for its population and to enhance the country’s development. This should be reached by 
increasing FDI inflows substantially and by intensifying trade. Undoubtedly, Mexico could 
indeed attract large amounts of FDI and was also able to increase its volume of trade 
considerably.  
Trade volume 
Concerning trade, Lederman and Servén state: “During the 1990s, Mexico became one of 
Latin America’s heaviest trading economies, with the highest volume of trade as a share of 
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gross domestic product (GDP). […] Importantly, this increase in Mexico’s trade was 
associated with fast growth in intra-NAFTA trade.”274 
However, this statement might be misleading, since it implies that Mexico’s trade volume 
augmented thanks to NAFTA. One must keep in mind that Mexico-US trade had already 
been very intense before NAFTA came into place, hence the above-described development 
might have also taken place without NAFTA. 
Foreign direct investment 
Concerning foreign direct investment, it is generally agreed upon that a “preferential trade 
agreement leads to higher investment inflows”275. According to Lederman and Servén 
NAFTA contributed between 25 and 30% of FDI increase in Mexico (when exports are 
held constant) and up to 60% of FDI increase taking into account the response of exports to 
NAFTA. However, FDI inflows did not develop as positively as expected over time, which 
might be due to several reasons: on the one hand, NAFTA might have only had a 
temporary effect on FDI development, on the other hand, external factors such as the 
emerging Eastern European countries and their attraction of FDI might have played a role 
and reduced FDI flows to Mexico.276 
Did growing trade volumes and FDI inflows increase welfare? As described in Chapter 
5.1, many important indicators did develop positively after Mexico’s entry into NAFTA. 
However it is hard to judge to what extent NAFTA contributed to this. Many authors credit 
Mexico’s big GDP growth to NAFTA. What can be said for sure is that without NAFTA, 
the US would have certainly not reacted that fast when Mexico slipped into the Peso crisis 
by the end of 1994. Hence, the quick recovery of GDP can be clearly contributed to 
NAFTA. 
Democratization 
Another time coincidence that cannot be neglected is the fact that Mexico’s 
democratization process started simultaneously with NAFTA. Although Mexico explicitly 
opposed political implications through NAFTA, only one government was led by PRI after 
NAFTA came into force.  The presidential elections of 2000 and 2006 were won by PAN, 
a liberal party which has far less ideological problems with NAFTA than PRI.  
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Successful Free Trade Agreement 
Taking a look on Free Trade Agreements on general, it has to be said that NAFTA is so far 
the most successful FTA, providing not only a big free trade area but also the necessary 
tools to handle it: “[…] Going beyond what other shallower preferential trade agreements 
have achieved, NAFTA established various dispute settlement mechanisms dealing with 
foreign investment and trade. It also established a review mechanism for the use of 
antidumping and countervailing duties.”277 
7.2 Drawbacks 
Of course NAFTA could not fulfil all expectations attached to it. Some drawbacks became 
apparent in the course of the past seventeen years. Here again, it is hard to determine to 
what extent NAFTA can be held responsible for certain negative developments, since 
many other factors contributed to Mexico’s economic development, too. However, some 
drawbacks that are clearly related to NAFTA shall be pointed out here. 
Income distribution: 
One consequence of Mexico’s economic liberalization that started back in the 1980s was a 
shift in income distribution that was further reinforced with NAFTA. According to a World 
Bank report economic liberalization generated “winners” and “losers”, namely the small 
number of large, well established business elites on the one hand and employees and 
smaller firms on the other hand: “A result is a striking concentration of wealth, especially 
at the top of the income distribution. Mexico is already highly unequal by international 
standards when measured in standard fashion: in 2000 the incomes of the top 10% of the 
population were 45 times that of the bottom 10 %, according to the national income and 
expenditure survey (ENIGH).”278 According to this report, this pattern repeated itself when 
NAFTA came into place. 
Relation between real wages and migration:  
One important aspect of the welfare goal the Mexican government had in mind when 
signing the NAFTA treaty was to reach (a certain degree of) real wage convergence with 
the United States. As Lederman and Servén put it: “Wages, jobs and migration were at the 
center of the political debate over the merits of NAFTA from the very beginning. A 
reduction in the wage differential between Mexico and the United States was one of the 
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primary hopes attached to NAFTA.”279 Higher wages in Mexico would benefit both 
countries: Mexico’s population would draw direct benefits and at the same time illegal 
immigration to the US would be lowered since real wage and emigration are negatively 
correlated.280  
However, as a comparison of Mexico’s censuses from the years 1990 and 2000 shows, real 
wages did not increase during this period within Mexico; on the contrary, real wages even 
declined, partly due to the 1995 crisis. According to Hanson, “the average hourly wage in 
1990 dollars declined for males from 1,33 USD to 1,11 USD and for females from 1,24 
USD to 1,13 USD.”281 With Mexican wages falling and US wages growing, one cannot 
talk about convergence on a national level.  
Nevertheless, some convergence has taken place – on a regional level: Real wage 
differentials have widened within Mexico and Northern states have higher wage levels than 
Southern states. While Northern wages seem to slowly converge with US levels, the South 
remains poor. According to Hanson this can be partly explained by “variation in regional 
access to foreign trade and investment and in regional opportunities for migration to the 
United States.”282 As his research shows, “regional relative wages are negatively correlated 
with distance to Mexico City and with distance to the Mexico-U.S. border.”283 
Looking at these developments the résumé is ambivalent: On the one hand wage levels 
could be partly increased, on the other hand only northern regions (and Mexico City) could 
profit from the positive circumstances created by NAFTA, while those suffering from the 
loss of state protection and those lacking certain infrastructure and education levels were 
impoverished. For the people living in these regions US wage levels remain incredibly 
high, which might also explain why immigration flows to the US have not decreased.  
Of course regional disparities have already existed before 1994; however, „the economic 
gap between the poorest regions or states within Mexico and the rest of the Mexican 
economy did increase after the trade reforms—including the unilateral reforms initiated in 
the mid-1980s.”284 To sum up, wage inequality within Mexico rose, convergence with US 
wages could not be reached and illegal immigration to the US remains a problem. 
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Agriculture 
Agriculture is a very sensitive topic within NAFTA. Tariffs on agricultural products will 
be the last to phase out by next year. It is not for sure what impact this will have on 
Mexico. On the one hand, heavily subsidized US agricultural products could swamp the 
country with cheap imports and thus undercut Mexican producers. On the other hand, 
Mexico subsidizes its farmers, too, and NAFTA offers many loopholes that allow to 
bypass true free trade in this area: “[..] all member countries have continued to use 
antidumping and countervailing duties according to their own national trade laws. In 
addition, NAFTA allows the use of temporary safeguard duties when a country faces 
sudden import surges that disrupt domestic production.”285 
Anyway, fears within the Mexican population are big that products like corn – which is of 
central importance to the Mexican diet – might disappear from Mexican fields in the 
future. Of course this would not only destroy deeply rooted traditions but also the existence 
of many Mexican farmers. A New York Times report links the topic with migration: “The 
flow of immigrants north from Mexico since NAFTA is inextricably linked to the flow of 
American corn in the opposite direction, a flood of subsidized grain that the Mexican 
government estimates has thrown two million Mexican farmers and other agricultural 
workers off the land since the mid-90s […].”286 
It is also interesting to know that most of Mexico’s population living under the poverty line 
lives in rural areas which are at the same time an important source of migrants to the US. 
Asian Competition 
One concern that is due to external factors is Mexico’s decreasing competitiveness vis-à-
vis Asian countries such as China or Vietnam. When the NAFTA treaty was signed, 
Mexico assumed it had a comparative advantage in labor-intensive activities over the US. 
However, it does not have this advantage relative to the emerging Asian economies of 
South-East Asia.  Mexico lost share in trade and FDI to China, since the US started to 
heavily invest in this region. As a footnote, this raises the question whether it is really 
necessary to agree upon a FTA in order to attract FDI and to increase trade volume. 
Mexico had to react and while it “may have a cost disadvantage relative to China in 
finished goods like t-shirts, plastic footwear, and simple consumer electronics, it appears to 
have a cost advantage in assembly services for the U.S. economy. Mexican manufacturing 
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has, in effect, reoriented itself from producing simple consumer goods to being a 
subcontractor for the North American economy.”287 
According to El Financiero, both China and Mexico reached considerable growth rates in 
exports to the US. China’s exports to the US increased by 375% within ten years, reaching 
152 billion USD in 2003. Mexico’s exports to the US reached 138 billion USD by 2003, 
which was an increase of 245% within ten years.288 
7.3 Summary 
Summing up the developments since Mexico’s orientation towards export led growth, it 
has to be said that not everything developed the way Mexico expected it to. Both exports 
and imports have risen considerably, which leaves the balance of trade as negative as 
before. The economic integration between Mexico and the US did not only stimulate 
export led growth (as had been expected) but also negative import substitution.  
In this context it is notable that the peso has been continuously depreciating against the 
USD in recent years, which is actually facilitating Mexican exports to the US, while 
making imports from the US rather expensive.  
By contrast, Poland’s Złoty has been appreciating against the Euro since the country’s 
accession to the European Union in 2004, which explains why imports to Poland are 
facilitated and exports rather hindered. 
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8 Insights about Poland’s development as part of the 
European Union 
So far Poland’s record within EU is not very long. At the moment the country experiences 
its third year within the European Union. However, preparations for its entry have been 
very careful and from the time of Poland’s application for membership until May 2004, 
fourteen years have passed. The time has not yet come to draw conclusions from this short 
membership; however, trends can already be observed and analyzed.  
According to an Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) report on Poland’s conditions for the 
upcoming years, “Poland enjoys several advantages in its efforts to catch up with the 
established members of the EU. It has a well-educated workforce and an attractive location 
near the important German market, but also a large and growing domestic market and easy 
access to the EU’s eastern neighbours. The political system is stable289, the financial 
system is secure and developing rapidly, and Poland's accession to the EU has entrenched 
an economic system based on private ownership and competitive markets with free access 
to markets in Western Europe.”290 
The EIU further estimates that an accession to the Euro zone until 2015 would have 
positive effects on Poland, too: Uncertainties concerning the Złoty’s volatility would be 
removed and Poland’s trade would receive an impetus for growth. 
While the EIU emphasizes the need for a rapid Euro adoption, one of Poland’s most 
important economists and former chairman of Poland’s central bank, Leszek Balcerowicz, 
highlights the need for investment: “The inflow of long-term capital will contribute to an 
increase in productivity through such means as the transfer of technology and introduction 
of better management techniques.”291  
In general it seems that most experts agree on Poland’s positive developments on its way 
to EU membership and after EU accession.  
In the following some benefits will be discussed as well as remaining problems Poland has 
to deal with. 
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8.1 Benefits 
Transformation to market economy with EU support 
The European Union has been playing a part in Poland’s transformation from the early 
nineties on, in the sense that financial support, technical assistance and know how were 
provided to the country. At the same time these close links from the beginning of 
transformation on mean that both Poland and the European Union had large preparation 
phases for the actual entry in 2004.  
The opening up of Mexico’s economy in the 1980s without guidance from a strong 
experienced partner and the rapid negotiations of NAFTA at the beginning of the 1990s 
seem somewhat chaotic and in some ways deficient compared to Poland’s transition and 
integration into Europe.  
Positive development of main economic indicators 
Poland’s main economic indicators have developed very positively: the country’s GDP has 
been continuously growing, with the most recent impulse given by EU accession in 2004; 
Polish trade has been growing considerably, too, although the country still needs some 
effort to reach a trade surplus; foreign direct investment also keeps flowing to the country. 
All these indicators show that Poland has managed to transform from a planned to a free 
market economy within little time.  
Regional disparities: EU support with structural funds 
One important difference to NAFTA is the European Union’s role of redistribution within 
the Union. Since one of the main goals within EU is convergence between the different 
member states, the budget is redistributed according to regional needs: Hence, poor regions 
receive more money from the structural fund than rich regions. This helps Poland in 
general, since it has many poor regions; but it also helps to overcome disparities within 
Poland.  
In the long run this is supposed to enhance Poland’s development considerably, and it will 
be interesting to observe in the future whether this approach of regional aid is able to stop 
emigration flows from Poland to wealthier EU countries.  
Perspective of deeper integration 
Since the European Union does not only consist of a free trade agreement but also of many 
other aspects, deeper integration is always possible. One aspect relevant for Poland’s 
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economy is monetary integration. According to Balcerowicz, the Euro is highly popular 
within Poland: “The proportion of Polish people pointing to the introduction of the euro as 
an important event in the EU member states rose from 69% in September 2001 to 88% in 
January 2002. The polls show that the idea of Poland joining the Euro zone and 
introducing the common currency enjoys great popularity with the general public in 
Poland. As many as 64% of Poles would wish the euro to become legal tender in 
Poland.”292 
The Polish Złoty has indeed developed positively over the past years. Since 2004, it has 
been (with slight variations) appreciating against the Euro.  
8.2 Drawbacks 
Although Poland has been praised for its rapid transition, and although Poles are said to be 
advocates of the European Union, the country has to struggle with some big problems, 
some of them related to its EU membership. 
Unemployment 
One of Poland’s biggest problems remains unemployment. Although this problem is not 
directly related with the European Union but rather with Poland’s transformation to a 
market economy in general, it still has to be stated that Europe has not found any solutions 
for this problem. Although it had been clear from the beginning that Poland’s 
unemployment rate would soar after transition, nothing could be done to stop that trend. 
Since many other EU members experience high unemployment rates, too, one can speak of 
a European problem that could not yet be solved by the European Union.  
On average, NAFTA members have considerably lower unemployment rates than 
European countries. 
Agriculture 
Poland’s agriculture forms an important part of the country’s economy and at the same 
time a big problem: structures are small and inefficient, and Poland struggles with its 
competitiveness in agriculture in the single market. “300 000 – 400 000 farms are 
economically viable, that is around 20 percent of all of them, according to data from the 
Institute of Agricultural and Food Economics (IERiGZ). These households invest, 
modernise themselves and bring relatively good profits. They are strongly tied with the 
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free market system. Over 40 percent of farms in Poland are not. Their owners live off the 
land and income from other sources, mainly old age and disability benefits.”293 
These inefficient structures bear the danger of ever higher unemployment since many 
farmers will be forced out of their jobs due to lack of competitiveness. Furthermore, 
according to the Polish News Bulletin, the current policy of exclusive financing by the EU 
could be changed to policies of co-financing by national governments soon: “At the time of 
joining EU, Poland agreed that the subsidies would initially amount to 25 percent and keep 
increasing, until they reach 100 percent, so that no more support from the national budget 
would be needed. Now it is possible that the EC will press for co-financing the subsidies 
with the help of national budgets of Member Countries. This is an unfavourable solution, 
as Polish agriculture is much less competitive compared to the Western countries.”294  
This reveals two more weaknesses: Poland still lacks competitiveness in some aspects of 
its economy. Agriculture is furthermore a good example for supranationalim: each country 
joining the European Union must automatically cede big parts of its national sovereignty.  
Poland lacks competitiveness 
According to the Centre for European Reform which publishes competitiveness rankings 
for EU members annually, Poland dropped back from second to last place this year. 
According to this report, “Poland's main drawback is unemployment. It does not invest in 
innovative businesses - spending on research and development in 2006 was lower than in 
2000. Polish companies continually have to adjust to different regulations and 
administrative procedures, which costs a total of 5 percent of GDP.”295 
Conflict between national sovereignty and EU supranationalism 
Recently, Poland has received a lot of media coverage. Europe’s entire press reported on 
the behaviour of the Kaczyski brothers concerning the European constitution. Of course, 
media reports were rather negative, given proposals such as using the square root of 
population numbers of each member country to calculate each country’s weight in EU 
decision making.  
However, one must not forget that Poland, and basically all countries not belonging to the 
six founding members, need to accept existing regulations when entering the European 
Union. Any candidate country wishing to join the Union must accept all existing EU 
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legislation and adopt it. This can be seen as a huge problem given that every country has to 
cede considerable parts of its sovereignty when wanting to join the European Union.  
In the case of Poland this causes even bigger concerns than in some other countries (like 
Austria which has been associated with the EU for decades before joining it): Poland 
regained sovereignty by the late eighties, after years of German and later even longer years 
of Soviet submission. There was a big need for “nation building”, for feeling independent. 
At the same time Poland was in need of joining the European Union, in order to develop as 
fast as possible. There lies the big conflict: the EU is moving more and more towards 
supranationalism while Poland (as well as the other Eastern European countries within EU) 
feels a great need for national autonomy and self-determination.  
Free trade agreements as a weaker form of economic integration do not bring along such 
problems. Mexico did not have to fear for its national sovereignty when joining NAFTA. 
8.3 Summary 
Similar to Mexico, Poland continues to have trade deficits despite its orientation towards 
export led growth at the end of the eighties. In relative terms, the country’s deficit is only 
slightly lower than Mexico’s. However, exports have been growing faster than imports 
(imports of goods doubled between 2001 and 2005 while exports of goods grew 2,5 times). 
This is particularly remarkable since Poland’s Złoty has been continuously appreciating 
against the Euro in recent years. 
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9 Conclusion 
As this paper shows, both Mexico and Poland have generally benefited from free trade, no 
matter whether free trade came along in the form of NAFTA or EU. Both countries were 
considerably poorer than their partner countries when joining the respective trade blocs and 
both countries have become wealthier over time.  
In general it can be said that Mexico’s economic goals associated with NAFTA – increase 
in trade volume and increase in FDI – have been achieved. Nevertheless, exports did not 
outrun imports in percentage terms. Furthermore, this trade intensification did not result in 
a general improvement of living conditions in Mexico, but rather in a concentration of 
wealth in specific regions.  
Furthermore it has to be said that hardly any convergence has taken place with the United 
States. Wage levels are still well below US levels in Mexico and illegal immigration to the 
United States continues, which clearly indicates that Mexicans still think the US is a better 
place to live and earn money than Mexico. 
The European Union’s approach to integration is more comprehensive and the future will 
show whether it is more successful than mere free trade agreements to enhance Poland’s 
welfare. Structural and regional differences are taken into account and Poland receives 
massive financial support in order to converge with the European Union’s “old” members. 
However, the turnaround has not yet come, as unemployment remains huge, Poles continue 
to emigrate and Poland’s population growth rate has become negative.  
Both countries have great difficulties with their lagging agricultural sectors. Integration in 
agriculture has not been successful yet. 
There is no doubt the upcoming years will be interesting for Mexico and Poland. In 
Mexico, President Calderón has to prove his economic and social capacities when all trade 
barriers on agricultural goods phase out. Meanwhile the United States will see a new 
President by 2008 and rumours of new NAFTA members (e.g. Chile) have been spread.    
The European Union has grown to 27 members at the beginning of 2007, shifting the focus 
of investors away from the 2004 entrants to Romania and Bulgaria; a constitution for 
Europe will finally be worked out and implemented starting from 2009; and the upcoming 
years will show whether the EU’s concept of integration can fulfil Poland’s economic 
expectations. 
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11 Appendices 
Appendix I: The European Single Market 1992 
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Appendix II: GDP levels in Mexico between 1940 and 2001 
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Figure 12: GDP levels in Mexico between 1940 and 2001 
 
Source: OECD The World Economy, Historical Statistics HS-4; http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/456125276116, accessed on June 21, 2007 
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Appendix III: GDP levels in Poland between 1950 and 1984   
GDP levels in Poland between 1950 and 1984
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Figure 13: GDP levels in Poland between 1950 and 1984 
 
Source: OECD The World Economy, Historical Statistics HS-3; http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/456125276116, accessed on June 21, 2007 
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Appendix IV: GDP per capital levels in Mexico and Poland between 1950 and 2001 
 
GDP per capita levels in Mexico and Poland between 1950 and 2001
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Figure 14: GDP per capita levels in Mexico and Poland between 1950 and 2001 
 
Source: OECD The World Economy, Historical Statistics; http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/456125276116, accessed on June 21, 2007
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Appendix V: Population and Population Growth Rate in Mexico   
Population in Mexico between 1980 and 2008
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
Year
P
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
M
i
l
l
i
o
n
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Population in Mexico between 1980 and 2008296 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2007 
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Population Growth Rate in Mexico between 1981 and 2008
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Figure 16: Population Growth Rate in Mexico between 1981 and 2008297 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2007 
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Appendix VI: Mexican GDP and GDP Growth Rate  
 
 
Mexican GDP in Current Prices
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Figure 17: Mexican GDP in USD between 1980 and 2008298 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2007 
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 2007 and 2008 levels are estimates. 
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Mexican GDP Growth Rate in Mexico between 1981 and 2006
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Figure 18: Mexican GDP growth rates in USD and MXN between 1980 and 2008299 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2007 
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 2007 and 2008 levels are estimates. 
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Appendix VII: GNI and GNI per Capita in Mexico  
 
 
Gross National Income in Mexico between 1990 and 2004
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Gross National Income per Capita in Mexico between 1990 and 2004
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Figure 19: GNI and GNI per Capita in Mexico between 1990 and 2004 
 
 
Source: The World Bank Group: Quick Query Millenium Development Goals, 2007 
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Appendix VIII: Mexican Imports and Exports  
 
Mexican Imports and Exports between 2000 and 2005
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Figure 20: Mexican Imports and Exports between 2000 and 2005 
 
Source: OECD - http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/viewhtml.aspx?queryname=324&querytype=view&lang=en, accessed on May 15, 2007 
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Appendix IX: Gross Capital Formation in Mexico  
 
Gross Capital Formation 
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Figure 21: Gross Capital Formation in Mexico between 1990 and 2004 
 
 
Source: The World Bank Group: Quick Query Millenium Development Goals, 2007 
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Appendix X: Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico  
 
FDI in Mexico between 2000 and 2005
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
F
D
I
 
i
n
 
M
i
l
l
i
o
n
 
U
S
D
Inflows of FDI
Outflows of FDI
 
Figure 22: FDI in Mexico between 2000 and 2005 
 
Source: OECD - http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/viewhtml.aspx?queryname=324&querytype=view&lang=en, accessed on May 15, 2007 
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Appendix XI: Exchange Rates - Mexico 
 
Exchange Rates in Mexico between 2000 and 2006: 
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Figure 23: Mexican Exchange Rates between 2000 and 2006 
 
Source: OECD - http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/viewhtml.aspx?queryname=324&querytype=view&lang=en, accessed on May 15, 2007 
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Appendix XII: Long term interest rates in Mexico 
 
 
Long Term Interest Rates in Mexico between 1992 and 2008
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Figure 24: Long Term Interest Rates in Mexico between 1992 and 2008300 
 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 81 database 
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 2007 and 2008 levels are estimates. 
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Appendix XIII: Inflation in Mexico  
 
Mexican Inflation, expressed in consumer prices, 
between 1980 and 2008
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Figure 25: Mexican Inflation Rate between 1980 and 2008301 
 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2007 
                                                 
301
 2007 and 2008 levels are estimates. 
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Appendix XIV: Regional Disparities in Mexico  
 
 
            
                              
Figure 26: Productivity and students in tertiary education per region in Mexico 
                             
Source: OECD Regions at a Glance, 2005, vol. 2005, no. 6, p.82 
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Appendix XV: Population and Population Growth Rate in Poland  
 
Population in Poland between 1980 and 2008
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Figure 27: Population in Poland between 1980 and 2008302 
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 2007 and 2008 levels are estimates. 
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Population Growth Rates in Poland between 1981 and 2008
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Figure 28: Population Growth Rate in Poland between 1981 and 2008303 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2007 
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 2007 and 2008 levels are estimates. 
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Appendix XVI: Polish GDP and GDP Growth Rate  
 
 
Polish GDP in current prices
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Figure 29: Polish GDP in USD between 1980 and 2008304 
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 2007 and 2008 levels are estimates. 
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Polish GDP Growth Rate in USD and PLN between 1981 and 2008
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Figure 30: Polish GDP growth rates in USD and PLN between 1980 and 2008305 
 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2007 
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 2007 and 2008 levels are estimates. 
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Appendix XVII: GNI and GNI per Capita in Poland 
 
 
Figure 31: GNI and GNI per capita in Poland between 1992 and 2005 
 
Source: The World Bank Group: Quick Query Millenium Development Goals, 2007 
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Appendix XVIII: Polish Imports and Exports  
 
Polish Imports and Exports between 2001 and 2005
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Figure 32: Polish Imports and Exports between 2001 and 2005 
 
Source: OECD - http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/viewhtml.aspx?queryname=324&querytype=view&lang=en, accessed on May 15, 2007 
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Appendix XIX: Gross Capital Formation in Poland 
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Figure 33: Gross Capital Formation in Poland between 1990 and 2005 
 
Source: The World Bank Group: Quick Query Millenium Development Goals, 2007 
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Appendix XX: Foreign Direct Investment in Poland 
 
Foreign Direct Investment in Poland between 2001 and 2005
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Figure 34: FDI in Poland between 2001 and 2005 
  
Source: OECD - http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/viewhtml.aspx?queryname=324&querytype=view&lang=en, accessed on May 15, 2007 
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Appendix XXI: Exchange Rates in Poland 
 
Polish Exchange Rates between 2001 and 2005: 
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Figure 35: Exchange Rates in Poland between 2001 and 2005 
 
Source: OECD - http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/viewhtml.aspx?queryname=324&querytype=view&lang=en, accessed on May 15, 2007 
 119 
Appendix XXII: Long term interest rates in Poland 
 
Long Term Interest Rates in Poland between May 06 and May 07
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Figure 36: Monthly Long Term Interest Rates in Poland between 2006 and 2007 
 
Source: European Central Bank - http://www.ecb.int/stats/money/long/html/index.en.html, accessed on July 6, 2007 
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Appendix XXIII: Inflation in Poland  
 
 
Poland's Inflation, expressed in consumer prices, between 1980 and 2006
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Figure 37: Polish Inflation Rate between 1980 and 2008306 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2007 
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 2007 and 2008 levels are estimates. 
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Appendix XXIV: Regional Disparities in Poland 
 
 
 
       
                                                                                                      
 
Figure 38: Regional GDP per capita and productivity in Poland 
 
 
Source: OECD Regions at a Glance, 2005, vol. 2005, no. 6, p.82 
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Appendix XXV: Regional Unemployment in Poland 
 
 
      
 
 
 
Table 5: Regional Unemployment in Poland between 2001 and 2005 
 
Source: Polish Government - https://intranet.kpk.gov.pl/sl/MOC/regionyadm.bmp, accessed on July 8, 2007; Eurostat - Eurostat: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/, accessed on July 6, 2007 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Average 
Lódzkie 19,7 20,3 19,6 18,7 17,3 19,12 
Mazowieckie 14,6 17 16,3 14,5 14,8 15,44 
Malopolskie 13 16,2 18 17,3 15,2 15,94 
Slaskie 19,7 20,1 20,2 19,3 19 19,66 
Lubelskie 14,7 16,6 16 16,7 14,3 15,66 
Podkarpackie 18 18,2 17,7 16,6 16,7 17,44 
Swietokrzyskie 17,9 18,8 19,1 20,6 18,9 19,06 
Podlaskie 16 16,8 17,7 15,6 14,4 16,1 
Wielkopolskie 17,7 18,2 17,1 18,2 17,1 17,66 
Zachodniopomorskie 22,4 26 25,4 23,8 22,7 24,06 
Lubuskie 24,3 26,3 24,5 23,2 19,1 23,48 
Dolnoslaskie 23,7 26 26 24,8 22,8 24,66 
Opolskie 18,1 19,7 18,3 17,8 16,9 18,16 
Kujawsko-
Pomorskie 20 21,5 21,8 22 19,8 21,02 
Warminsko-
Mazurskie 23,5 25,9 23,9 22,3 20,4 23,2 
Pomorskie 18,5 21,5 20,5 20,2 18,9 19,92 
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Appendix XXVI: Expert Interview 
 
Silvia I. Cardenas, Commercial Specialist 
US Commercial Service – Mexico 
The opinions contains in this interview do not express any U.S. official posture; they are 
only personal considerations and comments. 
 
1. The NAFTA treaty was signed more than a decade ago. What were the pronounced 
economic goals and objectives of the treaty for Mexico at that time? 
 
The main objective was to expand trade and investment; Mexico recognized that the 
economic and commercial links between both nations needed a more solid environment 
and business certainty to support economic growth. Also, there is a natural tendency to 
integrate economies, we had previously some sectors trade agreements (compensatory 
quotes, antidumping, etc.) and other economic blocks were consolidated. Mexico had to 
build a platform to support the future of our trade with the USA. 
 
2. Have these goals been accomplished? What advantages has the Free Trade 
Agreement brought for Mexico? 
 
In terms of business confidence, trade facilitation, cost reduced, yes, some goals were 
accomplished. However, NAFTA was only a part of an international trade strategy, was 
not the complete solution for Mexico’s development and economic growth.  Some of the 
advantages were to have an instrument to frame bilateral trade and to take advantages of 
some Mexican products competitiveness in the US and Canada markets. In contrast, the 
unequal market/companies sizes have been an important disadvantage for Mexico, as well 
as the lack of an exporting attitude among manufacturers, official institutions and 
businessmen. 
 
3. What are the disappointments of NAFTA from the Mexican perspective? 
 
Many small and micro companies completely disappeared; some sectors suffered the 
avalanche of US products: candy manufacturers, shoes, plastics and textiles. 
Unemployment by consequence grew up; many Mexican companies were not ready to 
 124 
compete and were devastated. It is nor possible to have a same conditions/treatments 
between unequal. 
 
4. Has the public opinion changed with regards to NAFTA? How was it seen in 1994 
and how is NAFTA seen now by the public? 
 
Unfortunately NAFTA is not a fashion matter any more, general public has a very short 
historic memory. There are many other troubles that are catching its attention: security, 
employment, environment, etc. Maybe in some months when the agricultural 
protection is removed the issue will recover attention and will be discussed again, but 
nothing is going to change.  On the other hand, NAFTA had in the past a political turn 
(criticism) by the PRD and the Mexican “left”, so it is used by political groups’ 
benefits. 
 
5. The last trade restrictions will phase out soon. What impact will this have on 
Mexican agriculture? Can Mexico compete with the heavily subsidized US 
agriculture? 
 
Unfortunately, Mexico cannot compete with US subsidies, and every year the 
agriculture situation is worse, we have been importing traditional products in high 
proportion. The agriculture is deserted, to the lack of Government’s integral support we 
have to add that the labour (work force) left their land to go to the USA to look for a 
job. NAFTA affected the agriculture, but more than that is the Mexican Government’s 
indifference to pay attention to one of the poorest social and economic sectors (the 
other is the native groups). 
 
6. The title of my diploma thesis is “Economic integration among unequal partners”: 
Are Mexico and the US more equal now (in economic terms) than they were at the 
beginning of the Nineties? 
 
No, I do not think so. A process to overcome underdevelopment does not take 13 years, 
maybe one complete generation, but up to now any underdeveloped country has 
reached the point to be developed. In economic terms our economy is situated in the 
18th worldwide place and the USA is the first, become equals will never happen. 
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Business conditions are better for big capitals and multinational companies, some 
sectors have been living a close integration: automotive, chemical/pharmaceutical, 
energy, but this integration does not mean balance development, it responses more to 
the “globalisation” process. 
 
7. Do you think the economic integration between NAFTA members should go 
further? 
Should a customs union or even a common market be considered? 
 
We are going towards that direction we like it or not. Recently the Mexican Treasury 
announced customs common procedures to combat illegal trade, including working 
hours and technical aspects. The process will take maybe 20 years but the economic 
links are so complex and strong that finally this will happen. A common market is a 
very long-term objective and the Mexican Government will avoid giving to much 
publicity to the facts that are taking us to that inertia or absorption. 
 
8. From an US perspective, has NAFTA contributed positively to the problem of 
illegal immigration? 
 
In my personal opinion, an illegal immigration reduction was a secondary gain for the 
US. The purpose was to help their companies to penetrate the market and to build its 
own regional block. Neither Latin America nor Mexico has been a top priority in the 
US international agenda but what they really want is to have a secure neighbour and 
more business. The immigration is a highly sensitive issue that any US Government 
will support a kind of reform, due to the internal conservative power of certain groups. 
 
 
 
 
